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FROM THE LIGHTHOUSES: HOW THE FIRST FEDERAL INTERNAL
IMPROVEMENT PROJECTS CREATED PRECEDENT THAT BROADENED THE
COMMERCE CLAUSE, SHRUNK THE TAKINGS CLAUSE, AND AFFECTED EARLY
NINETEENTH CENTURY CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATE
Adam S. Grace*
I will not go to a dictionary for the meaning
of the word “regulate.” I will go to the
history of legislation, commencing with the
foundation of this Government, and continued
without interruption or objection, on
constitutional principles, down to this day, to
prove what the undoubted right of Congress,
under the power in question, is.
Rep. Jacob C. Isacks
(Mar. 24, 1830)1
[The power to take private property] only
appears a little novel, because we are not
familiarized to it.
Rep. Joseph Hemphill
(Jan. 14, 1823)2
INTRODUCTION
In the first few decades of the nineteenth century, pages and pages
of the Annals of Congress and Register of Debates were filled with repeated
debates over the constitutionality of federally-sponsored internal
improvement projects—projects intended to facilitate commerce through
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improved transportation.3 Among other topics, Congressmen fought over
whether the power to “regulate” commerce included the power to
“facilitate” commerce by constructing roads and canals.4 And the existence
of a federal eminent domain power (potentially necessary to bring such
projects to fruition) was also questioned during these debates.5
The quotes above come from two such internal improvement
debates. At the time the statements were made, Congress was not debating
on a clean slate. Or rather, the slate was only one-third clean. Though a
question of crucial importance to the development of the country, whether
or not the Constitution empowered the federal government to create internal
improvements never reached federal court.6 But the slate did contain the
prior constitutional interpretations (or constructions) of the other two
branches of government. It was that slate—the “history of legislation”—
that Tennessee’s Jacob Isacks was consulting instead of the dictionary, in
searching for constitutional meaning. Isacks’ comment is a window to a
key aspect of the debate he and his colleagues were engaged in: whether
Congress could rely on legislative precedent (over the dictionary, even) as
conclusive of how the Constitution was to be interpreted.
The dominant twentieth and twenty-first century conception of the
balance of powers places the power of constitutional interpretation squarely
within the province of the judiciary.7 However, recent scholarship,
particularly by Larry D. Kramer, has argued for a revival of the legislature’s
3

“Internal improvements” was the phrase then used to refer to transportation projects.
Harry N. Scheiber, The Transportation Revolution and American Law: Constitutionalism
and Public Policy, in Transportation and the Early Nation 1, 1 (1982). In the 1780s, the
phrase was used loosely to refer to a variety of programs aimed at encouraging the new
nation’s “security, prosperity, and enlightenment,” but the concept eventually narrowed
until it became “synonymous with public works for improved transportation.” John Lauritz
Larson, Internal Improvement 3 (2001).
4
Other powers were often cited to justify construction of internal improvements, such
as the power to establish postal routes, the power to conduct military affairs, or the power
to spend for the nation’s general welfare, but my focus here is on how early Congresses
debated and constructed federal authority under the Commerce Clause.
A sense of the difficulty of the “internal improvements” question can be gleaned from
the fact that Justice Story, in his Commentaries on the Constitution, was unwilling to opine
on whether the Constitution empowered the federal government to construct roads and
canals and improve the navigation of watercourses. Joseph Story, Commentaries on the
Constitution of the United States, vol. II at 162-65 (3d ed. 1858)(saying that “the reader
must decide for himself upon his own views of the subject”).
5
For a discussion of eminent domain, see infra at ___.
6
Harry N. Scheiber, The Transportation Revolution and American Law:
Constitutionalism and Public Policy, in Transportation and the Early Nation 1, 3 (1982).
7
Larry D. Kramer, The People Themselves: Popular Constitutionalism and Judicial
Review 8 (forthcoming).
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historical role in determining constitutional meaning,8 and the proper roles
of court and legislature in constitutional interpretation are very much in
debate today.9
But rather than entering that debate, let us return instead to the
internal improvement debates of the early nineteenth century. In doing so,
we find much strongly worded dissent from Mr. Isacks’ view that Congress
could rely on legislative precedent to impart meaning to words in the
Constitution when the dictionary may have suggested otherwise.10 The
issue was not just one of balance of powers (whether Congress, rather than
the Court, could impart meaning to the Constitution). Central to the debate
was whether legislative precedent could be given weight in any
constitutional interpretation. It is a question that goes to the heart of the
nature of our Constitution.
As John Reid has shown, the concept of constitutional law being
built on custom was a part of 18th-century jurisprudence.11 Just as rights
8

Id. at 176-92; Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme Than Court? The Fall of the
Political Question Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 Col. L. Rev. 237,
319-30 (2002); Keith E. Whittington, Constitutional Construction 1-3 (1999); Barry
Friedman & Scott B. Smith, The Sedimentary Constitution, 147 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, n.271
and accompanying text (Nov. 1998).
9
See, e.g., Matthew D. Adler & Michael C. Dorf, Constitutional Existence
Conditions and Judicial Review, in Marbury v. Madison: A Bicentennial Symposium, 89
Va. L. Rev. 1106 (Oct. 2003); L.A. Powe, Jr., The Politics of American Judicial Review:
Reflections on the Marshall, Warren and Rehnquist Courts, in Judicial Review: Blessing
or Curse? Or Both? A Symposium in Commemoration of the Bicentennial of Marbury v.
Madison, 38 Wake Forest L. Rev. 697 (Oct. 2003). The Supreme Court’s recent
Commerce Clause trilogy (United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); Printz v.
United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995)) has also
fueled the debate.
10
See, infra, ___. Research by Michele L. Landis has found that reliance on
precedent played a significant role in early Congressional provision of disaster relief.
Those early legislative acts bear a quasi-judicial stamp (in Landis’ words, Congress was
acting more like a court than a legislature in handling requests for relief), and
Congressional debaters often argued either that precedent must be followed to ensure that
analogous cases would be treated equally, or that a particular petition should be denied for
fear of creating additional precedent. Though some argued against the binding nature of
precedent, by the late 1820s many members in Congress felt bound by prior actions to
entertain (and pay) federal claims for relief under similar circumstances. See Michele L.
Landis, “Let Me Next Time Be ‘Tried by Fire’”: Disaster Relief and the Origins of the
American Welfare State 1789-1874, 92 Nw. L. Rev. 967, 1003, 1009-11, 1015-16 (Spring
1998); Michele L. Landis, Fate, Responsibility, and “Natural” Disaster Relief: Narrating
the American Welfare State, 33 Law & Soc. Rev. 257, 268-70 (1999).
11
John Philip Reid, The Authority to Legislate 153 (1986); Kramer, The People
Themselves 22-28 (discussing 18th century view that Constitution could be amended by
precedent). See also Kramer at 261-76 (discussing early nineteenth century shift in
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could be established by customary practice, the dangerous flipside was that
any innovation in the law could become “mutated from an aberration into a
precedent.”12 In Reid’s words, the creation of precedent was the “ultimate
constitutional risk,” because through it the unconstitutional could be
converted into the constitutional.13 The internal improvement debates of the
early nineteenth century provide a rich example of a debate over whether
earlier conceptions of a customary constitution still held sway. Did
legislators of the period believe that prior unopposed legislative practices
could be deemed precedent that would provide meaning to an evolving
Constitution, or did they believe that reliance on such precedent was
unconstitutional because it could potentially amend the fixed words of the
Constitution outside the established amendment mechanism?14
In arguing that legislative precedent established Congress’
“undoubted right” under the Commerce Clause, Representative Isacks was
harkening back to the then longstanding federal practice of building one
particular type of internal improvements: lighthouses and similar
navigational aids.15 In fact, despite the slow evolution of the federal
internal improvement program, the power to build lighthouses was
established within the first five months of the First Federal Congress.16
From that early date forward, the power to “regulate” (i.e. facilitate)
commerce by constructing such navigational aids was continuously
exercised without serious challenge. And just as routinely, federal
thinking of Constitution similarly to ordinary law).
12
Reid, The Authority to Legislate at 157-58.
13
Id. at 158.
14
Supreme Court practice during the same period has been characterized as enforcing
the “original meaning” of the Constitution, based on an understanding that such meaning
was “fixed” and could only be changed by formal amendment. See Howard Gillman, “The
Collapse of Constitutional Originalism and the Rise of the Notion of the ‘Living
Constitution’ in the Course of American State-Building,” 11 Studies in Am. Pol. Devel.
191, 192, 194, 198-204 (Fall 1997). But compare id.at 204 (interpreting Justice Marshall’s
decision in M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819), as consistent with a fixed original
understanding of the scope of federal power) with H. Jefferson Powell, “The Original
Understanding of Original Intent,” 98 Harv. L. Rev. 905, 940-44 (1984-85) (saying that
Justice Marshall shared Madison’s acceptance of the authority of precedent). See also
Caleb Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive Conventions, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 519, 525-29
(2003) (discussing Madison’s conception of constitutional meaning being “liquidated” or
“settled” over time through precedents); David A. Strauss, Common Law, Common
Ground, and Jefferson’s Principle, 112 Yale L.J. 1717 (May 2003) (setting forth a modern
theory of “common law” constitutional interpretation).
15
“It has been the work of every year to make harbors, build custom-houses,
warehouses, seawalls, light-houses, and do every thing which the convenience of external
trade requires.” 6 Reg. Deb. 662 (1830).
16
See Act of Aug. 7, 1789, ch. 9, 1 Stat. 53 (the “Lighthouse Act”).

[18-Mar-04]

From the Lighthouses

5

lighthouse construction was relied on as a helpful analogous precedent by
Congressmen arguing in favor of a broader power to construct roads and
canals.17
Whenever Congress debated the legal weight to be given to
Commerce Clause precedents, construction of lighthouses and related
navigational aids was always a factor in the discussion. In fact, the birth of
the federal lighthouse system provides an excellent example of the power
that legislative precedent—or the lack of such precedent—had over the
development of constitutional interpretation in the early republic.
In 1789, when the First Federal Congress first sat, it would not have
been clear to everyone that (1) the federal government had the power to
construct lighthouses; and (2) that the power to “regulate” commerce
included the power to “facilitate” commerce by constructing such internal
improvements. Nevertheless, the Commerce Clause precedent created by
the Lighthouse Act remained virtually unquestioned even while the power
to “construct” improvements and “facilitate” commerce would be debated
for decades in relation to proposed road and canal programs. Whether the
lighthouse precedent was to be accorded broader application was heavily
debated. But the precedent of federal lighthouse building was never turned
back.
In the first half of Part I, I explain how the Commerce Clause was
expanded so quickly to encompass federal lighthouse operation. As it turns
out, the federal government’s swift entry into questionable constitutional
waters did not occur because the First Federal Congress arrived at a
principled interpretation of the Commerce Clause, to be applied in all
analogous situations. Rather, the federal government took up this one type
of internal improvement so rapidly because of narrow considerations
stemming from the newly-imposed federal tax policy. With the new federal
government collecting the specific type of duties previously relied upon by
states to maintain their lighthouses (“tonnage duties”), political
considerations were greatly aided by an interpretation of the Commerce
Clause that justified creation of a federal lighthouse system.

17

See, infra, ___. A typical example is this argument by Massachusetts’ Timothy
Pickering, made thirteen years before Isacks’ remarks: “[C]ommerce (which consisted in
the exchange of commodities) was carried on by land, as well as by water; and if Congress,
under the clause for regulating commerce, could rightfully do, what, from the formation of
the Government, they had been doing and without a single objection—erecting lighthouses, beacons, and piers, to give facility and safety to commerce by water; why should
they not exercise the like power to facilitate, secure and render less expensive by means of
roads and canals, the commerce by land?” 30 Annals of Cong. 859 (1817).
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In the second half of Part I, I show how the precedent of lighthouse
building was relied in during the internal improvement debates, and how
interpretations of the Commerce Clause were affected by such legislative
precedent. In sum, subsequent Congressional debate shows that although
the Lighthouse Act was enacted before it would have been widely accepted
that the power to “regulate” under the Commerce Clause included the
power to “facilitate” commerce (and for reasons related to the nexus
between lighthouses and federal tonnage policy), the legislative precedent
for lighthouses became solidified as a valid Constitutional interpretation.
In Part II, I examine the eminent domain issue raised by the second
quote provided at the beginning of this article. The federal government’s
power to take private property was not confirmed by the Supreme Court
until the 1870s. The accepted historiography holds that the federal
government did not exercise its eminent domain powers until that late date
because of doubts that the power existed. However, the history of the
federal lighthouse program in the 1790s suggests the need for
reconsideration of the accepted eminent domain historiography. In brief,
there is evidence that the early administrators of the lighthouse program
were more prepared than previously assumed to exercise federal takings
power—and that the delay in solidification of a federal eminent domain
power occurred not because of doubts that existed right after the founding,
but rather because the use of the power never took hold as precedent for
other reasons. As explained in Part II, early exercise of the power
combined federal acquisition of title (which did not require state consent)
with acquisition of jurisdiction (which did require state consent), and later
politicians blurred the two concepts together in arguing that the federal
government lacked the power to take title without state consent.
In other words, an examination of the birth of the federal
lighthouse system shows us both sides of the power that non-judicially
created precedent could hold in the early republic. Because lighthouses
were routinely constructed, the interpretation of the Commerce Clause
followed suit. But because the federal government had not routinely and
clearly exercised its powers to condemn property without any state
involvement, federal takings power shrunk, even though earlier
understandings of the Constitution could have supported its exercise.
We turn now to an examination of how the federal lighthouse
system created Commerce Clause precedent in the first months of the First
Federal Congress.
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I. FEDERALIZATION OF LIGHTHOUSES AND THE CREATION OF LEGISLATIVE
PRECEDENT UNDER THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
A. How federal tax policy led to the establishment of Commerce Clause
Precedent in the first five months of the First Federal Congress
In a world with speedy land and air transportation, and sophisticated
navigation systems, it is easy to forget how important lighthouses were to
our eighteenth century predecessors. But when the First Federal Congress
first sat in March 1789, a dozen or so (now quaint, to us) pillars with lamps
guided the way over the nation’s most significant commercial routes.18 All
of them had been put there by the individual colonial and state
governments.19 In assessing whether the framers or ratifying conventions of
the Constitution would have anticipated the new federal government
immediately supplanting the state governments’ role in erecting and
maintaining them, three facts are worth noting:
At the Constitutional Convention, the question of federal control
over lighthouses was not debated. Delegate James McHenry considered
making a motion to provide for such power, but on the last day of debate—
the day after the convention rejected a motion by Benjamin Franklin for a
grant of power to cut canals—McHenry’s Maryland delegation moved
instead for a clause preventing Congress from restraining States from laying
“duties of tonnage” for erecting lighthouses and clearing harbors.20 In
response to the motion, the convention decided to treat tonnage duties the
same way imposts and duties on imports and exports were treated; states
would be restricted from laying them without the consent of Congress.21
Thus, the Constitution left a significant potential lighthouse funding
18

See Dennis L. Noble, Lighthouses & Keepers 5 (noting that colonial lighthouses
were erected near important ports of trade). Decades later, water travel was still superior to
overland commercial routes.
19
Francis Ross Holland, Jr., America’s Lighthouses: An Illustrated History 8-12, 6980 (1988). Prior to 1789, the national government expended no monies for erecting or
repairing lighthouses or navigational aids. American State Papers, Vol. 2, Ser. 15, No. 235
(Expenditures for Surveying the Seacoast, Bays, &c, and for the Lighthouse Establishment,
communicated to the Senate, Nov. 17, 1820). That can be contrasted with the interstate
postal system, which a 1982 Congressional ordinance dubbed “essentially requisite to the
safety as well as the commercial interest” of the United States, and into which the
Contintental Congress had poured over $150,000 in order to keep it afloat. Journals of the
Continental Congress at 670 (Fri. Oct. 18, 1782); Wayne E. Fuller, The American Mail 36
(1972).
20
Max Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, Vol. II at 504
(McHenry) (1911); id. at 615 (Madison), 625 (Madison), and 633 (McHenry). Tonnage
duties were traditionally used to fund lighthouse operations. See, infra, at __.
21
Id. at 624-26 (Madison), 633-34 (McHenry).
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mechanisms to subsequent political resolution, and said nothing explicitly
one way or the other regarding state or federal power to construct and
operate lighthouses.
Second, during the ratification period, both federalists and antifederalists argued from the position that the federal government would lack
power over building lighthouses and other forms of internal improvements.
Federalists assured a wary public that the federal government would not
interfere with such traditional state operations.22 Anti-federalists decried
the fact that the Constitution left the states nothing more than that.23 The
anti-federalist concern was not that Congress would start building
transportation-related projects, but that it might interfere with the states’
own projects by virtue of its broad power over critical sources of funding
(i.e. taxes).24
Third, throughout the ratification period—and even while Congress
was first sitting—states continued to plan and construct new lighthouses, in
addition to maintaining the existing structures.25 That is not to say that the
state-run system was without problems. But in 1789, the state-built
lighthouse system was functional and in the capable hands of stateappointed caretakers.26
22

XV Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution, Commentaries on
the Constitution, Public and Private, Vol. 3 at 453, 457-8 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds.,
1984) [Number 472, “A Freeman I,” Pennsylvania Gazette, 23 January, 1788]; id. at 508,
510 [Number 488, A Freeman II, Pennsylvania Gazette, 30 January, 1788].
23
In Patrick Henry’s words to the Virginia ratification convention, “What shall the
states have to do? Take care of the poor, repair and make highways, erect bridges, and so
on, and so on? Abolish the state legislatures at once. What purposes should they be
continued for? Our legislature will indeed be a ludicrous spectacle….” 3 Elliot’s Debates
171 (June 9, 1788).
24
XVII Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution, Commentaries on
the Constitution, Public and Private, Vol. 5 at 133, 142 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 1995)
[Number 688, “A Farmer,” Philadelphia Freeman’s Journal, 16, 23 April 1788].
25
See, e.g., Acts and Laws of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts (publ. 1893),
1787—Ch. 21 (p.577) and 1787—Ch. 31 (p.595); Acts and Laws of the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts (publ. 1894), 1789—Resolves, Ch. 131 (p.600); Hennings—1787, Ch. I,
section XXII (p.428), Ch. IV, section XV (p.442), section XXXI (p.445); Contract between
the Commissioners of the Navigation of Cape Fear and Matthew Lyall, dated May 28,
1788, located in Record Group 26 of the National Archives, 17G, Box 1; William
Campbell, Benjamin Smith, Henry Toomer, George Hooper, M. R. Willkings, Auly
Macnaughten, and Thomas Withers to Alexander Hamilton, Sept. 5, 1791 (reprinted in IX
Syrett 173) (stating that construction began in 1788, and describing plan and state of Cape
Fear lighthouse); David Stick, Bald Head: A History of Smith Island and Cape Fear 32
(1985) (concluding that state did most of the work on the Cape Fear lighthouse); XXV The
State Records of North Carolina (Walter Clark, ed.) 54 (1906) (Ch. 58 of 1789 laws,
providing for erection of lighthouse on “Ocacock Island”).
26
Report of Alexander Hamilton to George Washington, June 18, 1790 (providing
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Given that background, why did the dramatic change from state to
federal control over these key pieces of state-owned infrastructure occur so
quickly in the early days of the First Federal Congress? It was not because
of a shared majority conception of the new government’s broad role in
internal improvement projects. Rather, the expansion of federal power
grew out of a conflict between typical state funding mechanisms for
lighthouses and Congress’ exercise of its new taxation powers.
Prior to 1789, a primary source of funds for constructing,
maintaining, and operating lighthouses had customarily been the assessment
of “tonnage duties” (or “light money”) on ships that came into port.27 The
Constitution gave the federal government the power to assess tonnage
duties, and (as noted above) provided that states could not lay such duties
without federal consent. As a general matter, of course, the more taxes the
federal government collected, the fewer the resources left in state hands for
any state-run projects. But with lighthouses there was additionally a
specific link between a particular type of tax and the projects traditionally
funded by that tax. It is that link that brought the Commerce Clause issue to
the fore so quickly: If the federal government collected tonnage duties
rather than consenting to state assessed duties, what would happen to the
states’ lighthouses? Could the federal government constitutionally take
control of them? These are the questions that arose as soon as Congress sat
down to discuss the issue of tonnage.
1. The Tonnage Act Debate:
How Constitutional and Political
Issues Regarding Federal Operation of Lighthouses Were
Effectively Resolved Before They Had Been Fully Debated
[If the Constitution] had in view institution of
lighthouses and other things, [it] might have
favorable summary of the present condition of the lighthouses, and stating that the prior
state-appointed keepers have been recommended as proper to be continued).
27
The following are examples of state light money statutes: Leonard Woods Laberee,
ed., The Public Records of the State of Connecticut from May, 1785, through January,
1789 22 (1945); XIX, Pt. 2 Colonial Records of the State of Georgia 476, 479 (1911);
XXV State Records of North Carolina (Walter Clark, ed.) 54-55 (1906); N.H. Act of Apr.
16, 1784; XII Statutes at Large [Virginia] (William Hening, ed.) 304, 305 (1823); X
Records of the State of Rhode Island (John Russell Bartlett, ed.)105 (1865); Acts and Laws
of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts 1782-83 at 543 (1890).
Though lotteries and general revenues were also used for lighthouse construction,
light money was (in addition to being an important source of funds for construction) the
major source of funds for ongoing operational and maintenance costs. See id.; George R.
Putnam, Lighthouses and Lightships of the United States 1, 4-6, 11, 15, 18, 22 (1933);
Edward Rowe Snow, The Lighthouses of New England 1716-1973 at 322 (1973).
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given [Congress] this power by introducing
few words.”
Rep. Theodorick Bland,
during the tonnage debate28
Revenue was the new government’s primary need. And so, after a
month of waiting for congressmen to arrive, and a week spent ironing out
procedural matters, the House got down to business in early April 1789,
with James Madison introducing an impost and tonnage resolution in order
to cure “the deficiencies of the federal treasury.”29 The main goal was
generating revenue, but by including tonnage duties in his resolution,
Madison also intended to address another need: use of Congress’ taxation
and regulatory powers to bolster American commerce by addressing power
disparities the individual states had faced in their competition with foreign
shipping.
Accordingly, the draft resolution set forth (with blanks for the
amounts yet to be debated) a protectionist schedule of separate tonnage
duties for American vessels, foreign vessels, and foreign vessels from
countries with whom the United States had treaties.30 The inability of the
states to respond as a unified group to other nations’ harmful foreign trade
policies had been a significant problem during the Confederation, and
Madison’s resolution was intended to achieve a national tonnage policy of
“discrimination” against foreign vessels.31
The reaction to Madison’s introduction of the discriminatory
tonnage issue was swift. South Carolina’s Thomas Tudor Tucker,
representing a state whose merchants relied heavily on British shipping,
immediately voiced his objection, asking that discussion of the matter be
28

X Documentary History of the First Federal Congress of the United States of
America (Bickford, Bowling, and Veit eds.) [“DHOFFC”] 395 (May 4, 1789) (Lloyd’s
Notes, 4 May).
29
Id. at 1-2 (Apr. 8, 1789) (The Daily Advertiser, 9 Apr. 1789).
30
Id. at 2.
31
As reported in the Daily Advertiser, Madison explicitly stated that the subject of his
resolution “might be considered in two points of light. First as it respected only the
regulation of commerce. Secondly as to revenue.” Id. at 1. “Regulation” refers to the
impact that the various imposts and tonnage duties would have on commerce related to the
targeted items and vessels. See, e.g., James Madison to Jos. C. Cabell, Esq., Sept. 18,
1828, reprinted as Madison on the Tariff, Letter 1, in 4 Elliot’s Debates 600, 601, 604
(stating that the power to regulate trade with foreign nations “embraces the object of
encouraging by duties, restrictions, and prohibitions, the manufactures and products of the
country;” and describing Virginia’s pre-convention view that uniformity of commercial
regulations was needed between the states and foreign nations); Jeffrey T. Renz, What
Spending Clause? (Or the President’s Paramour), 33 J. Marshall L. Rev. 81, 88-94 (1999)
(discussing Congress’ power to levy duties for either revenue or regulatory purposes).
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deferred until additional representatives were present.32 The motion
succeeded and the tonnage issue was set aside while Madison’s proposed
imposts were debated.33
On April 21, the House returned to the issue of tonnage, the first
point of discussion (in the order of Madison’s resolution) being how much
American vessels should be charged. Massachusetts’ Benjamin Goodhue
(whose state was a major center of the American shipping industry) opened
the debate by questioning why Congress should impose any tonnage on
American vessels at all.34 The response provided by Pennsylvania’s
Thomas Fitzsimons gives us the first mention of lighthouses by the First
Congress: Why was tonnage needed? In order to raise sufficient revenue
for “lighthouses, and regulation of places that are incident to them.”35
Madison agreed, and chimed in with the suggestion that there were also
other “establishments incident to commerce” for which “some small
provision of this kind was necessary”—such as hospitals for disabled
seamen.36
The above quotes could certainly support a conclusion that Congress
set out to assert national control over the lighthouses, and then looked to the
tonnage duty as a means for funding it. But such a conclusion is called into
doubt by the underlying motives of the actors, by comments of other
Congressmen, by the actions of Congress as a deliberative body, and by the
historical background. Nationalization of the lighthouse program and
imposition of federal tonnage duties on both American and foreign shipping
represents a chicken and egg problem: did federal tonnage policy require
32

X DHOFFC at 12 (Apr. 9, 1789) (Lloyd’s Notes, 9 Apr.) (noting the differing
interests states had respecting tonnage duties, and threatening vote against Madison’s
resolution if the tonnage duty were “persisted in”); George C. Rogers, Jr., Evolution of a
Federalist: William Loughton Smith of Charleston 173-74 (1962) (discussing how a high
tonnage rate on foreign vessels would hurt South Carolina).
33
X DHOFFC at 49 (Tucker, Apr. 11, 1789) (Lloyd’s Notes, 11 Apr.); id. at 111
(Madison, Apr. 14, 1789) (Congressional Register, 14 Apr.).
34
Id. at 223 (Apr. 21, 1789) (Lloyd’s Notes, 21 Apr.) (Goodhue: “At a loss for
tonnage at all. . . .I wish some gentleman give reason why a duty on American vessels.”).
35
Id. at 223 (Apr. 21, 1789) (Lloyd’s Notes, 21 Apr.).
36
Id. at 254 (Apr. 21, 1789) (Congressional Register, 21 Apr.). The phrase “incident
to commerce” appears in only one of the three extant versions of Madison’s speech.
Lloyd’s Notes reads as follows: “Several necessary purposes required, conveniently
provided for by tonnage duty—hospital for mariners. Some fund raising from ships would
be natural and convenient for this purpose….” Id. at 224 (Lloyd’s Notes, 21 Apr.). In The
Daily Advertiser, Madison is recorded as having said “there was a number of objects to
which this duty would be most properly applied, and which rendered this tax proper and
expedient—such were the support of light-houses, the erecting hospitals for disabled
seamen and other things of that sort—For these purposes a tax on shipping was the most
natural and convenient resource.” Id. at 241 (Daily Advertiser, 22 Apr.).
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federal responsibility for lighthouses, or did a perceived need for a federal
lighthouse policy result in an imposition of additional tonnage duties? The
weight of the evidence suggests the former is much more likely: the driving
force behind Congress’ action was tonnage policy, and not lighthouses.
Both Fitzsimons and Madison shared the intent to impose a
discriminatory tonnage on foreign vessels in order to protect and encourage
American ship-building. Fitzsimons also thought that foreign tonnage was
an important source of revenue to be exploited.37 Of course, if revenue
generation from foreign ships were a legislative goal, then the same amount
of discrimination (in terms of the absolute difference in cents-per-ton)
would yield greater revenue from foreign shipping if American tonnage
were set above zero (e.g., zero cents versus twenty cents per ton generates
more revenue than ten cents versus thirty cents per ton). But even if
discrimination were the only purpose in determining where foreign tonnage
should be set, then either setting domestic tonnage at zero or disclaiming a
need to provide for lighthouses could have posed problems for achieving a
meaningful national tonnage policy.
For one thing, Fitzsimons and Madison must have been able to
foresee that the lower the American tonnage, the harder it would be to
subsequently convince opposing Congressmen to set foreign tonnage high
enough to have an impact on foreign nation’s shipping policies.38 Second,
setting the domestic tonnage duty at zero and foregoing federal lighthouse
operation could have threatened the system of a unified policy of
discriminatory tonnage.
If the national government did not assess any tonnage duties on
American shipping, that would leave a potential source of revenue open to
the states. To the extent some states exploited that source, and others did
not, it would be impossible to keep the nation’s discriminatory tonnage
policy uniform. Of course, as discussed above, the Constitution limited
37

Id. at 491 (May 6, 1789) (Congressional Register, 6 May). Madison disclaimed
wanting a high foreign tonnage in order to generate revenue. Id. at 497. Others agreed
with Fitzsimons. Id. at 497 (Page).
38
See id. at 488 (Livermore, arguing that a high foreign tonnage duty was needed in
order to have something to give up to Britain when she is willing to enter into a treaty); 496
(Ames, arguing against those who said that foreign duty ought not to exceed more than two
or three times the duty laid on American shipping: “I beg to remind gentlemen it never
was the intention of the House to impose any duty whatever on American shipping, the 6
cents that were laid was upon a different principle. This being the case, gentlemen will not
draw any inference from what was done, to favor what is yet to be done….”); 453 (May 5,
1789) (Congressional Register, 5 May) (Jackson, saying that a foreign duty of 20 cents
created sufficient encouragement of American shipping because “the duty on our own
being only 6 cents”).
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state authority to assess tonnage duties by requiring congressional
consent.39 However, if the lighthouse system were left in state hands, states
with ports would have a legitimate ground for seeking such consent—by
potentially widely differing amounts depending on the number of
lighthouses and local variations in operating costs, not to mention any
political desires to adjust the amount of tonnage “required.” Given the
necessity of lighthouse operation, it would be difficult indeed for Congress
not to grant such consent. Thus, those in favor of a uniform discriminatory
tonnage policy—such as Madison and Fitzsimons—had a strong motive to
lay the responsibility for lighthouses on the federal treasury in order to
justify imposition of domestic tonnage duties, in that way securing complete
federal control over the domestic-foreign tonnage differential, as well as the
absolute amount of tonnage assessed to any foreign nation.40
As the rest of the historical evidence bears out, federalization of
lighthouses was not important as a national public works policy, but as a
taxation policy.41 Though by its very nature, the subsequent passage of the
39

U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
In assessing whether Madison was truly concerned that important national programs
be federally funded, or whether his reference to “establishments incident to commerce”
was a way of justifying his tonnage resolution, it is worth pointing out (1) that he never
attempted to enumerate a complete list of such establishments: “I think sufficient reason
given why some duty imposed on these [American] vessels.” (X DHOFFC at 224 (Apr. 21,
1789) (Lloyd’s Notes, 21 Apr.) (Madison)); and (2) the low domestic tonnage of six cents
was agreed to without any data regarding the states’ lighthouse expenses and funding, other
than a comment by Fitzsimons that Pennsylvania laid a duty of 6 to 7 cents which covered
lighthouse and pilot expenses and added little more. Id. at 225 (Fitzsimons); see id. at 224
(Smith, Maryland, saying that the proposed six cents was “so moderate” as to not injure
merchants, and that tonnage duties in Maryland and other states were far larger).
As it turned out, the only “establishment” Madison mentioned other than
lighthouses—hospitals for disabled seamen—was not legislated for until the Fifth Congress
(1798), and funding was provided not from tonnage but from deductions from the seamen’s
salaries. 5th Cong., Sess. II, Ch. 77 (July 16, 1798). Although a bill providing for a marine
hospital had first been introduced in August 1789, the matter was continuously tabled over
the years, despite two separate petitions (in 1791 and 1793) for congressional action. See I
House Journal 63, 92, 111, 112, 137, 364, 696; II House Journal 16, 250-51.
41
During the tonnage debate, one representative suggested that the purposes that had
been asserted as requiring a domestic tonnage (lighthouses and hospitals) could be funded
by impost duties on goods, so that no tonnage on American shipping was necessary. X
DHOFFC at 224 (Apr. 21, 1789, Sturges) (Lloyd’s Notes, 21 Apr.) and 241 (The Daily
Advertiser, 22 Apr.). Madison and his supporters simply ignored the suggestion. Whether
that was a politically or fiscally workable solution was never debated. But it is easy to see
that it would not have constituted wise tax policy. The issue here was not just preserving
uniform tonnage policy, but “preempting” as many sources of revenue as the federal
government had, constitutionally, at its disposal. Cf. Stanley Elkins and Eric McKitrick,
The Age of Federalism 118-19 (1993) (noting that Hamilton’s desire to have the federal
government assume outstanding state debts stemmed in part from a desire “to preempt the
40
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Lighthouse Act of 1789 carried with it federalism implications connected
with the Act’s exercise of federal commerce powers, its genesis in the
Tonnage Act debate reflects that the real underlying federalism issue
concerned federal taxation policy. Congress’ decision to exercise its
Constitutional grant of exclusive power over tonnage duties ended up
dictating the division of federal and state responsibility over the major
structures funded by those duties.
Two questions of federal power—whether Congress should “take up
[the] business” of lighthouses, and whether Congress could constitutionally
do so—were briefly mentioned during the Tonnage debate.42 The latter was
passed over without further discussion (at least for now; it was discussed
when the Lighthouse Act was debated). But the first question received
decidedly more attention. The key answer to the question was provided by
South Carolina’s Thomas Tucker: “If we neglect this measure at present [I]
don’t know how the lighthouses are to be supported . . . .”43 Tucker did not
elaborate on the nature of his concern, but he had to be referring to the
states’ inability to charge tonnage without Congressional consent. The only
other possible meanings for his words can be ruled out as implausible or
without factual foundation.
Why would support of the nations’ lighthouses be threatened if
Congress did not address the tonnage issue right away? There are really
only two possibilities other than the Constitution’s tonnage clause: (1) That
the Constitution clearly mandated that the federal government operate the
best sources of revenue for the United States Treasury”). Charging even a relatively small
amount of domestic tonnage presented states’ citizens with a tax burden that would help
minimize a state’s political will (and ability) to seek consent for additional tonnage
assessments for its own purposes.
42
Although Massachusetts’ George Partridge agreed that pilots and lighthouses would
constitute expenses legitimately covered by tonnage (and, according to Partridge, the only
legitimate ones at that), he found Fitzsimons’ attempt to secure tonnage for those expenses
to be premature because “We don’t know that such expense will arise. It is proposed by
some gentlemen to take up this business. Whether or no is uncertain.” X DHOFFC at 22425 (Apr. 21, 1789) (Lloyd’s Notes, 21 Apr.). Partridge suggested waiting for a bill to
brought in for the purpose of paying pilots and supporting lighthouses: “If that found
expense to United States, then time enough to charge the ships of United States with this
expense.” Id. at 224.
Later in the debate, Virginia’s Theodorick Bland questioned whether the federal
government had the power to run the lighthouses, suggesting that if the Constitution “had
in view institution of lighthouses and other things, [it] might have given [Congress] this
power by introducing a few words.” Id. at 395 (May 4, 1789) (Lloyd’s Notes, 4 May).
43
Id. at 225 (Apr. 21, 1789) (Lloyd’s Notes, 21 Apr.)(“If we neglect this measure at
present don’t know how the lighthouses are to be supported….I think a light duty is
necessary and appears if take up tonnage at all then [this is] proper time to fix what it
should be.”).
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lighthouses, and states lacked all authority to do so themselves; or (2) That
the states were, in fact, failing to keep up their lighthouses and federal
intervention was needed to keep the lighthouses running. As for the first
possibility, it would have been remarkable for the anti-federalist leaning
Tucker to have taken such a position (indeed, he made the complete
opposite argument months later during the Lighthouse Act debate). As for
the second possibility, there is no historical evidence of major systemic
failures in lighthouse operation throughout the states, let alone any evidence
of Congressional perception of such failures.44 In fact, Tucker subsequently
proposed a scheme that would have left states in control of lighthouse
operation, supported by a part of the federal tonnage money (6 cents per
ton) and whatever additional amounts an individual state needed to assess in
order to maintain its lights. And though Tucker’s proposal was rejected, the
lighthouse bill that was passed implicitly allowed for the possibility of
continued state lighthouse operation.45
On the other hand, when Tucker questioned how lighthouses would
be supported if Congress did not assess a tonnage duty to do so, one thing
was certainly true: Under the Constitution, the states had no authority to
collect tonnage duties unless they had been given congressional consent to
do so. And as no state had requested such consent, Tucker’s point was that
unless Congress acted to fill the revenue gap, the states would be left
without the main source of funding they relied upon to keep the lighthouses
burning.46
44

As discussed above, states at the time were not only operating current lighthouses
but were engaging in building projects for new ones. See supra, ___. Though shipwrights
and mercantile interests petitioned the First Congress throughout the first few months of its
first session, Congress did not receive any petitions decrying a poor state of lighthouse
management or expressing an urgent need that the federal government take over lighthouse
operation.
45
See, infra, at ____.
46
See also X DHOFFC at 224 (Apr. 21, 1789) (Lloyd’s Notes, 21 Apr.) (William
Smith, saying that states repealed tonnage laws because “[i]t was supposed necessary.”).
Of course, one answer to that predicament would have been for Congress to give consent to
the states to charge a tonnage duty. Although Tucker eventually pushed for that very
solution during debate on the Lighthouse Act, he did not raise that possibility during the
tonnage debate. One wonders whether he did not mind his colleagues’ linking of
lighthouse operation with domestic tonnage because he wanted to make sure that
Massachusetts did not succeed in its attempt to leave domestic ships free of all tonnage.
Apparently, once he partially lost the debate on the discriminatory foreign tonnage, he
sought to limit the amount of federal monies used to support lighthouses, with a
corresponding grant of power to each state to assess additional duties as needed. See, infra,
at ___.
In any event, as the above discussion shows, providing universal consent to states for
lighthouse operation would not have been a popular solution in Congress (and, in fact, it
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Either Congress needed to validate state tonnage collection by
consenting to it, or it needed to fund lighthouses itself. The debate on the
Tonnage Act left no doubt as to which policy Congress would follow.
Consent was not palatable. The Constitution empowered Congress to
institute a uniform federal tonnage policy, and uniformity was a desired end
in the first months of the First Congress. Achievement of that end was best
served by federal control of lighthouses.
It would be inappropriate to conclude that because of the linkage
between tonnage policy and lighthouses Congressmen simply ignored the
question whether Congress in fact had the power under the Constitution to
operate lighthouses. The issue did end up getting debated when the
Lighthouse Act was considered. But still, what are we to make of the fact
that the question was ignored during the Tonnage debate, even while
lighthouse support was being used as a reason for assessing tonnage
duties?47
On the one hand, discussion of constitutionality may have been
considered premature. To the extent that the Tonnage Act simply
established the fees that ships could be charged for lighthouse management,
such legislation would seem to come squarely—and uncontroversially—
within the Commerce Clause’s power to regulate commerce.48
On the other hand, members of the House no doubt understood that
including lighthouse fees in the Tonnage Act went hand-in-hand with
additional federal activity, such as, at the very least, paying for state
lighthouse expenses out of the federal treasury.49 Why, then, was the House
was rejected by Congress when Tucker moved for it months later).
47
The six cents domestic tonnage was agreed to by the House of Representatives on
April 21. X DHOFFC at 242. On May 29, the House passed the entire tonnage bill and
sent it to the Senate. VI DHOFFC 1950. Only days later, on June 2, did it form a
committee to bring in a bill for regulating lighthouses. V DHOFFC 1246. The Tonnage
Act was passed by both houses on July 9, and signed into law by the President on July 20.
VI DHOFFC 1951. The Lighthouse Act was first debated on July 16, and was signed into
law on August 7. V DHOFFC 1247-48. Despite one congressman having explicitly raised
the issue of constitutionality during the tonnage debate (see, supra, note ___), the Tonnage
Act was passed without debate on the matter.
48
See, supra, note ___, discussing the relationship between tonnage duties and the
regulation of commerce. This relationship was understood, and lobbied for, by those
outside of Congress. On May 25, 1789, Congress received a petition from the Shipwrights
of Philadelphia, seeking certain regulations that would benefit American shipping. Second
on the shipwrights’ list was a proposal “to encourage the Increase of American Shipping”
by laying no tonnage duty on American ships “except for the support of Bays [Buoys] &
Lighthouses.” VIII DHOFFC 348, 349.
49
See X DHOFFC at 224-25 (Apr. 21) (Lloyd’s Notes, 21 Apr.) (comments of
Partridge: If supporting lighthouses and paying pilots are “found expense to the United
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so willing to include what was essentially “light money” in the Tonnage Act
before a lighthouse bill was even drawn up and debated? Was it so clear
that a lighthouse bill would be constitutional? To attempt an answer to that
question, we must first examine the legislative history of the Lighthouse
Act.
2. Debate and Passage of the Lighthouse Act: Commerce Clause
Interpretive Precedent is Established
The Tonnage Act meant that the United States treasury would
possess money collected for the support of lighthouses. But important
questions remained: How would that money be distributed? Who would be
in charge of spending it? Who would operate the lighthouses? Would the
federal government be involved in constructing new lighthouses? Congress
explored a variety of solutions to these questions, but every draft bill shared
two things in common: state choice and federal control. Both elements set
the stage for the constitutional debate that followed.
State choice
From the very first draft, the operating principle was that the federal
government would not fund or operate a state’s lighthouse unless the state
wanted it to.50 For example, the first draft provided that upon a state’s
“application” to the Secretary of the Treasury, the federal government
would provide the state’s lighthouse(s) with an “overseer,” with necessary
materials for keeping the lights, and would reimburse the expense of
supporting the lights.51 Thus—no state application, no federal funds.
In the version of the law that was enacted, the element of consent
was delayed, but present nonetheless: in the first instance, the federal
government would, without the need for a specific state request, pay for the
“support, maintenance, and repairs” of all lighthouses; however, such
payments would stop after a year unless the state in question had in the

States, then time enough to charge the ships of United States with this expense;” and “It is
proposed by some gentlemen to take up this business. Whether or no is uncertain.”).
50
V DHOFFC 1248 (Lighthouses Bill {HR-12}, July 1, 1789); 1249 (same, July 20,
1789); 1252 (same, July 24, 1789). The only “exception” was a provision for federal
construction of a new lighthouse at Cape Henry, which Virginia had apparently requested.
See Hamilton to Commissioners of Cape Fear, June 11, 1791, reprinted in VII Syrett at
464. But even there, the Act provided that the new lighthouse would only be erected when
the selected land was ceded by Virginia. Thus, Virginia had the ultimate say in the matter.
51
V DHOFFC 1248 (section 1 of the bill). Additionally, if the state ceded the
lighthouse and land to the United States, the federal government would keep the light “in
good repair at the expense of the United States.”
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meantime ceded jurisdiction and title over the lighthouse lands.52 As
cession of lighthouses was not mandated, states could effectively opt out of
the federal lighthouse program by choosing not to cede their lands.53
Is the requirement of state consent constitutionally relevant?
Though one can certainly glean the political and practical necessities of not
imposing a federal program on unwilling states, there is nothing to indicate
that Congress believed that state consent was a constitutional prerequisite to
federal funding of lighthouses, or even federal lighthouse operation by
“overseers.” But lighthouses exist in physical space, and the physical space
of existing lighthouses was located within State boundaries. If the federal
government wanted full control over any lighthouse lands—not just title,
but exclusive federal jurisdiction as well—then state consent would indeed
be required, by the Constitution’s “Enclave Clause.”54
There is another reason, though, that the draft bills’ provision for
state consent is constitutionally relevant—and in a manner that bears
directly on our analysis of the Lighthouse Act as an early construction of
the Commerce Clause. If states had the power to opt out of federal support
of their lighthouses, then they were not constitutionally precluded from the
field of lighthouse operation. In short, all of Congress’ draft lighthouse
bills reflect an understanding that if the federal government did not act, the
states still (theoretically) could.55

52

Lighthouse Act, § 1.
However, the phrasing of the law leaves one with the impression of federal coercion
(effectively, “do this if you want federal funds”) rather than state choice. In the context of
the Tonnage Act, which secured for the federal treasury the duties customarily used to fund
lighthouse operation, the proviso was indeed coercive.
That was not lost on
Massachusetts’ lieutenant-governor, Samuel Adams. See, infra, ____.
54
Article I’s “Enclave Clause” provides that Congress shall exercise “exclusive
legislation . . . over all places purchased by the consent of the legislature of the State in
which the same shall be, for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dockyards, and other
needful buildings.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 17. From an early date, the power of
“legislation” was equated with “jurisdiction.” See, e.g., United States v. Bevans, 17 U.S.
337, 388 (1818) (“the power of exclusive legislation (which is jurisdiction) is united with
cession of territory”).
Thus, in the final version of the Lighthouse Act, the proviso for state consent was not
a political act of federal restraint, but an act of constitutional necessity.
55
See Alexander Hamilton, Draft Opinion on the National Bank, reprinted in VIII
Syrett at 104 (referring to Lighthouse Act as an analogous exercise of federal authority
supporting broad interpretation of “necessary” powers, and stating that it could not be
“affirmed” that it “was absolutely necessary that provision should be made for this object
[i.e. lighthouses] by the National Government or that the interests of Trade would have
essentially suffered if it had been left upon its former footing or that the power of
regulating trade would be nugatory . . . .”).
53
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Federal Control
Every draft of the lighthouse bill provided not just for use of federal
monies in the support of lighthouses, but for federal control over how that
support would be carried out.56 Tucker and fellow South Carolinian
William Loughton Smith tried to change that, but failed.57 As debate on the
lighthouse bill opened, Tucker moved to strike out the whole bill (except
the enacting clause) and substitute it with a bill that kept lighthouses under
state control. Under Tucker’s plan, basic funding would come from the
federal government (through an appropriation of a proportion of tonnage
duties, not to exceed six cents per ton) but if those monies were not
sufficient states would be empowered to lay additional tonnage duties in
harbors with lighthouses.58
In Tucker’s motion, we see the inextricable link between the
Tonnage Act and operation of the nation’s lighthouses. Tucker could
perhaps have simply suggested keeping the states in charge of both
lighthouse operation and funding, but (and remember his comments to this
effect during the Tonnage Act debate) complete state funding would not
work because the federal government was collecting tonnage duties. Thus,
Tucker’s motion provided for state operation using federal appropriations
(the six cents “assigned” to lighthouses during the Tonnage Act debate). It
is a solution that carried with it problems for both the federal government
56

At first glance, the Act appears to provide merely for federal reimbursement of state
expenditures. However, federal control is implied by section 3, which requires the
Secretary of the Treasury, with Presidential approval, to contract for lighthouse rebuilding
and maintenance, furnishing of supplies, and the hiring of persons appointed by the
President to superintend and care for the lighthouses.
57
Tucker and Smith were political rivals whose leanings were towards opposite ends
of the anti-federalist (Tucker) and federalist (Smith) spectrum. But they both shared their
state’s concern about protecting South Carolina’s trade with Great Britain from harmful
actions by the federal government, and they joined together both in the Tonnage Act debate
and in debate on the Lighthouse Act. George C. Rogers, Jr., Evolution of a Federalist:
William Loughton Smith of Charleston (1758-1812) 168, 171, 173-77, 180 (1962).
58
Tucker’s motion was paraphrased in the Daily Advertiser as follows:
The principle of this was to place the establishment both of light
house and pilots in the hands and under the controul of the state
government, the former to be supported by the appropriation of a
certain proportion of the duty on tonnage of vessels, not exceeding
six cents per ton—and in case that were insufficient, that each state
should have power to lay an additional tonnage duty on all vessels
entering the ports where such houses were erected, and that pilots
should be under the direction of the states.
XI DHOFFC 1130 (July 16, 1789) (Daily Adv., 17 July). As mentioned below, the
Lighthouse Act left regulation of pilots—at least for the moment—in State control. See,
infra, at ___.
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(which would lose control over how its money was spent) and the states
(whose lighthouses might require additional funding).
Enabling states to assess additional tonnage duties would solve the
second problem, but in pushing for that solution Tucker was fighting an
uphill battle on a hill that was built when the Maryland delegates lost their
tonnage motion two years earlier at the Constitutional Convention. With
the Constitution prohibiting states from assessing tonnage duties without
federal consent, Tucker had no leverage in the lighthouse debate.
Basically, state control over tonnage duties was not going to
happen. And once the Tonnage Act asserted federal control over tonnage
duties, then federal funding of lighthouses was, as a practical matter, a
required policy—or rather, the offer of federal funding was required.
Forcing states to operate lighthouses at the same time the federal
government was capturing all tonnage duties would have been unfair. And
it is certainly understandable that Congress would want to place lighthouses
under their control if they were going to be footing the bill.
The question, of course, is what does the Constitution have to say
about all of this? Tucker’s motion led to a debate in the House that touched
on that very topic.
The Commerce Clause Debate
Unfortunately, only a portion of the debate sparked by Tucker’s
motion has been preserved. After reporting on opposing arguments made
by Pennsylvania’s Fitzsimons (who had been a member of the committee
that drafted the initial lighthouse bill, and represented a state whose
merchants strongly supported the legislation) and Tucker and Smith, the
Daily Advertiser leaves us with the unhelpful summary “[o]ther arguments
were used on both sides.”
Such as it is, we know at least this from the reported debate:
Echoing Madison’s comment during the tonnage debate about powers
“incidental” to the Commerce Clause, Fitzsimons stated that the
Constitution conferred every power “incidental and necessary to it,” and
that “regulations respecting light houses . . . were a part of the commercial
system and had been given up by the states.” In response, Tucker and
Smith contended that the lighthouse bill “was an infringement on the rights
of the states; that these establishments were not necessarily incidental to the
power of commerce.”59
59

XI DHOFFC 1130 (July 16, 1789) (Daily Adv., 17 July). Fitzsimons was actually
arguing that Tucker’s proposed bill was unconstitutional, not that the committee’s bill was
constitutional. However, Fitzsimons’ commerce clause argument implicitly provides an
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And so, we know that the Commerce Clause was cited to justify the
Lighthouse Act, and we know that some Congressmen believed that control
over the nation’s lighthouses was outside the scope of that enumerated
power. Whether or not other powers were cited, but not recorded for
posterity, we cannot say with certainty. But those looking back during the
First Federal Congress cited only the Commerce Clause as the source of
authority for the Act, and President Jefferson later remembered that
opposition to the Act focused on the proper scope of the Commerce
Clause.60 To use David Currie’s phrasing of the Commerce Clause issue,
the potential problem with the Lighthouse Act is this: “the construction and
operation of [lighthouses] is not itself regulation of commerce, and not
obviously necessary or proper for its regulation, which is what the
Constitution seems literally to require.”61
Whether “regulation” of commerce broadly included enactment of
measures to facilitate commerce would remain a point of contention for
answer to the latter question. As David Currie has pointed out, Fitzsimons’ words—as
reported by the Daily Advertiser—can be read as suggesting not just that federal action was
lawful, but that “the subject could not be left to the states.” David P. Currie, The
Constitution In Congress 70 n.117 (1997). However, such an argument would be
inconsistent with the bill reported by Fitzsimons’ committee (as well as all subsequent
versions of the bill), because, as discussed above, the bill left it in states’ hands to choose
whether or not they wanted federal operation of their lighthouses. Assuming the
paraphrasing we have is accurate, the phrase “had been given up by the states” is probably
best interpreted as a broadly phrased statement of the legitimacy of federal power.
Notably, in his attempt to “shoot down” Tucker’s proposal to leave things under state
control, Fitzsimons also broadly argued that Tucker’s amendment was unconstitutional
because states could not lay imposts, though, as Tucker and Smith rightly pointed out,
“[n]othing was clearer…than that each state had a power of laying an impost with the
consent of Congress; and if Congress by this law expressed their consent, the
supplementary duty proposed by the amendment was perfectly constitutional.” XI
DHOFFC 1130 (July 16, 1789) (Daily Adv., 17 July).
60
A year and a half later, participants in the National Bank debate, citing the precedent
of the Lighthouse Act to establish the Bank’s constitutionality, similarly grounded federal
lighthouse authority in the commerce clause. See XIV DHOFFC 388 (Ames, Feb. 3,
1791); Opinion on the Constitutionality of an Act to Establish a Bank, VIII Syrett 97, 104
(“This doubtless must be referred to the power of regulating trade, and is fairly relative to
it.”).
Years later, when Jefferson questioned how the Commerce Clause could empower
Congress to build piers, if it did not also permit the (indistinguishable) power to build
factories, he recollected that opposition to the Lighthouse Act was made “on this very
ground.” David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress: Jefferson and the West, 18011809, 39 Wm. and Mary L. Rev. 1441, 1500 n.314 (May 1998) (quoting Letter from
Thomas Jefferson to Albert Gallatin (Oct. 13, 1802)).
For a general discussion of possible Constitutional arguments that could have
supported the Lighthouse Act, see Currie, supra note 8, at 69-70.
61
Currie, supra note 8, at 70.
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decades afterwards.62 And it is unclear how secure the members of the First
Federal Congress in August 1789 would have been in explicitly adopting
such a broad definition of “regulation.” Widely accepted was the general
precept that a central aim of the federal government should be to aid
commerce by regulation (such as enactment of the Tonnage Act and
establishment of nationally uniform impost duties). Far murkier is the
degree to which members of the First Congress would have agreed that the
phrase “to regulate commerce” itself meant to take any measure that would
protect, facilitate or encourage commerce—or even the narrower concept of
creating or operating any facility that would affect commerce.63 Even
Hamilton, in his December 1791 Report on the Subject of Manufactures,
had to admit to a lack of consensus regarding the constitutionality of federal
involvement in road and canal building projects that would facilitate the
transportation of commodities.64
62

Compare 30 Annals of Cong. 889-90 (1817)(Sheffey: the words “to regulate”
commerce conferred the power “to afford it all reasonable facilities”) with id. at 897-98
(Barbour: “To regulate, was to prescribe, to direct; the power, therefore, ‘to regulate
commerce amongst the several States,” meant the right to prescribe the manner, terms, and
conditions, on which that commerce should be carried on.”). See, infra, ___.
63
During the Confederation period, the regulation of commerce and the protection, or
encouragement, of trade were virtually interchangeable concepts—but as ends or goals.
The means by which one fostered trade was through regulations. See, e.g., 26 Journals of
the Continental Congress 321-22 (Apr. 30, 1784). As Madison put it, in his 1828 letter
opining on the Constitutionality of a tariff imposed for the encouragement of manufactures,
“the power to regulate trade with foreign nations . . . embraces the object of encouraging by
duties, restrictions, and prohibitions, the manufactures and products of the country.” 4
Elliot’s Debates 600, 601. See supra note ___.
During the debate on the National Bank, Hamilton expanded the means to the end,
suggesting that “an establishment which furnishes facilities to circulation and a convenient
medium of exchange & alienation, is to be regarded as a regulation of trade.” VIII Syrett
127. On the other hand, both Randolph and Jefferson defined the power to regulate
commerce in terms limited to enactment of rules and prescriptions (id. at 115 n.24 and 126)
and Madison’s suggested list of enumerated powers that could (but did not) permit creation
of the Bank did not even include the Commerce Clause. 2 Annals 1946 (Feb. 2, 1791). As
supporters of the National Bank cited a number of enumerated powers justifying the
legislation, passage of the Act cannot be considered a definitive vote on the scope of the
Commerce Clause. Much less significant proposals intended to encourage or assist
commerce were rejected by the First Congress, but as objections included both policy and
constitutional grounds, the debates similarly do not permit a conclusion one way or the
other as to whether constitutional concerns held sway. See Currie at 71-73 (discussing
proposal that Congress underwrite a private voyage to Baffin’s Bay to enhance
understanding of the magnetic pole, and a proposed loan to rescue a glass factory from
financial difficulties).
64
Improvement of inland navigation, said Hamilton, was an object “worthy of the
cares of the local administrations; and it were to be wished, that there was no doubt of the
power of the national Government to lend its direct aid, on a comprehensive plan.” X
Syrett 230, 310. Granted, Hamilton was discussing the encouragement of manufactures,
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Perhaps most telling of all is Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion
decades later in Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824), after thirty years of
unquestioned federal lighthouse power. This is how Marshall rejected
Ogden’s suggestion that certain powers left to the states demonstrated
concurrent state and federal power over regulating commerce:
A State, it is said, or even a private citizen,
may construct light houses. But gentlemen
must be aware, that if this proves a power in a
State to regulate commerce, it proves that the
same power is in the citizen. States, or
individuals who own lands, may, if not
forbidden by law, erect on those lands what
buildings they please; but this power is
entirely distinct from that of regulating
commerce, and may, we presume, be
restrained, if exercised so as to produce a
public mischief.65
Thus we see that even in the most significant statement of federal
Commerce Clause power to date, the building of an internal improvement
project is characterized as something other than commercial “regulation.”66
That the issue had not been conclusively understood differently back in
and not commerce—the two cannot be conflated—but if Congress were of the view that
roads and canals were permissible under the Commerce Clause, that would have been
sufficient to serve Hamilton’s purposes.
In a subsequent House debate during the Second Congress spurred by a Senate bill
that proposed paying a “bounty” to the desperate owners of boats employed in cod
fisheries, the narrow view of the Commerce Clause can be heard in the remarks of
representatives Page and Giles. 3 Annals of Cong. 393-94 (1792) (encouragement to
commerce might redound to honor of Congress, but the “wise framers” saw that if
Congress had power to exert a “royal munificence” for that purpose it might reward the
ingenuity of one state’s citizens over another); id. at 398 (right to regulate commerce may
give rise to indirect “bounty” resulting from the right to make commercial regulations, but
that is they only type of bounty that can be given). Though there certainly were other
thorny issues relating to the proposed bounty, one wonders how much briefer the debate
would have been had there been a widespread understanding that the power to regulate
commerce broadly included the power to facilitate commerce. Indeed, perhaps many
words could have been spared over a decades worth of “general welfare” debates if it were
understood that the Commerce Clause enabled Congress to simply spend money to
facilitate commerce.
65
Id. at 208-09. Consistent with the above, Marshall narrowly defined the power to
regulate as the power “to prescribe the rule by which commerce is to be governed.”
66
Marshall’s language was not lost on opponents of federally-sponsored internal
improvements. See, infra, ___.
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1789, one need only look at today’s originalist scholarship. As wellestablished as the application has become these 200-plus years later, the
idea that the Commerce Clause empowers the federal government to
facilitate commerce through internal improvement projects is one that
modern-day originalists either still ignore or struggle mightily with.67
So why the apparent lack of concern by a majority of the First
Federal Congress (including, presumably, James Madison) over the
Lighthouse Act’s potential stretching of the Commerce Clause? For one
thing, the Act’s passage should not obscure the fact that Congress was still
treading gingerly in this area. Initial drafts of the bill were limited to
operation of lighthouses, beacons, and buoys, with “piers” being added only
after a group of Philadelphia merchants lobbied for their inclusion—based
on the fact that the Philadelphia port wardens had commenced construction
of piers that would be left without funding by virtue of the Tonnage Act.68
No mention at all was made of river clean-up or harbor improvement, items
that seem indistinguishable from lighthouses in rendering navigation “easy
and safe.” A separate bill proposing a hospital for seamen—which Madison
had similarly referred to as an “incident” of commerce—was tabled.69 And
the regulation of pilots—if anything, a much clearer example of true
commercial “regulation,” and no less an example of legislation that would
be geared to making navigation “easy and safe”—was left under state
control “until further legislative provision shall be made by Congress;” and
no such further provision was made.70 So, as boldly as Congress was
67

See Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 68 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 101, 139-46 (Winter 2001) (starting with proposition that “The power to regulate is,
in essence, the power to say, ‘if you want to do something, here is how you must do it,’”
and exploring whether such a power could also include the power to prohibit certain types
of commerce); Grant S. Nelson and Robert J. Pushaw, Rethinking the Commerce Clause:
Apply First Principles to Uphold Federal Commercial Regulations but Preserve State
Control over Social Issues, 85 Iowa L. Rev. 1, 39-42 (Oct. 1999) (conceding that whether
the Framers and Ratifiers’ intent included the power to create internal improvements is
“debatable,” but satisfying themselves that the original conception of commerce “possibly
encompassed internal improvements”).
68
Philadelphia Merchants to the Pennsylvania Delegation, dated July 16, 1789 (on file
at the Federal First Congress Project, Wash., D.C.). An early example of successful
lobbying, the Lighthouse Act incorporates a fair amount of language from a proposed bill
that the merchants sent with their letter. V DHOFFC 1248-54.
69
1 House Journal 112 (Sept. 16, 1789). See, supra, note ___.
70
Lighthouse Act, § 4. Not only did later Congresses fail to act on proposals to
regulate pilots both locally and nationally, they tabled proposals seeking a nationwide
system of harbor regulation. See I House Journal 92, 112, 137, 451, 456, 489, 615; II
House Journal 29. However, pilots were as important as lighthouses in assuring safe
passage into harbors. See Petition of the Boston Marine Society, Commonwealth of
Massachusetts, to the honorable Senate and the honorable House of Representatives of said
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moving, the Lighthouse Act was still a somewhat limited move in asserting
control over “incidents” of commerce (to use Madison’s word), or in
funding projects to make navigation “easy and safe” (to use the words of the
Act).
Limited or not, though, Congress’ first statute construing the
Commerce Clause nonetheless represented an interpretation of the clause
that was potentially broad in application (though there is no evidence that
any such future applications were discussed). In determining why Congress
was not dissuaded by Tucker and Smith’s contention that lighthouses “were
not necessarily incidental to the power of commerce,” one cannot overlook
the power of a Congressional sense of fairness. The fact that Congress was
denying the States the right to collect money specifically appropriated for
lighthouses was not lost on participants and observers of the day. Even
Tucker’s motion called for federal funding of lighthouses. And even antifederalist Sam Adams, venting his opposition to the Act in correspondence
to Elbridge Gerry, observed that if “Congress by Virtue of the Power vested
in them have taken from the State for the general Use the necessary Means
of supporting such Buildings, it appears reasonable and just that the United
States should maintain them . . . .”71 Indeed, in lobbying Congress to add
funding of piers to the Lighthouse bill, the Pennsylvania merchants
explicitly stated that the amendment was appropriate because Congress
would be keeping the tonnage duties previously anticipated to be collected
by the state.72
National tax policy and fairness—these were the forces that led to
such an early expansion of Commerce Clause power. But without a firm
common understanding that the Commerce Clause did indeed empower the
Commonwealth in General Court assembled at Boston, February 1783 (on file at the
Massachusetts Archives, in the bill jacket for Ch. 19--1783).
71
Samuel Adams to Elbridge Gerry, Aug. 22, 1789. In this letter, Adams was only
willing to concede the appropriateness of federal funding, stating “but I think that it follows
not from hence, that Congress have a Right to exercise any Authority over those Buildings
even to make Appointments of Officers for the immediate Care of them, or furnishing them
with necessary Supplies . . . .” However, the motivating factor of Adams’ correspondence
was an attempt to protect a friend whom he feared would lose his job to a political
appointee once the federal government took over. Samuel Adams to Elbridge Gerry, Aug.
20, 1789. In his last letter on the topic, Adams conceded the appropriateness of federal
control once a state had ceded its lighthouse to the federal government, but argued that the
federal government should refrain from exercising that authority. Adams to Gerry, Sept.
1789 (undated).
72
Philadelphia Merchants to the Pennsylvania Delegation, dated July 16, 1789. The
letter enclosed an estimate of the annual expense of maintaining their port’s lighthouse (“&
other Accommodations for the Ease & Safety of our Navigation”), which the merchants
said Congress should provide for “upon the same principles.” Id.
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federal government to broadly engage in internal improvement projects,
would the interpretation unleashed so quickly by the Lighthouse Act take
hold?
3.

The Federal Lighthouse System: Creation of Historical Commerce
Clause Precedent

To an anti-federalist, what I have described as the “fairness” of the
Lighthouse Act was something else entirely. To the ever wary Samuel
Adams, the choice presented to states by the Lighthouse Act was not a real
choice at all—states were being forced to consent to federal control. Adams
suggested to Elbridge Gerry that Congress would face the same fate as the
British government if, by governing “too much,” it so insisted on
unnecessarily forcing states to give the federal government exclusive
jurisdiction over their lighthouses. What particularly rankled Adams was
the combined effect of the Tonnage and Lighthouse Acts: “The Means of
supporting these Buildings in this State are taken from its Legislature---It is
presumed not to be intended that this Legislature shall be told at the End of
the Year, you must cede your Lighthouse to Congress & the Territory on
which it stands together with the exclusive Power of Legislation, or it shall
be of no Use to your state.”73
Whether others did not consider Congress’ behavior as unseemly, or
whether practical realities won the day, state legislatures fell into line with
federal policy and gave up their lighthouses fairly promptly, and without
much sign of controversy.74 The only significant holdout was, perhaps not
surprisingly, Rhode Island, which did not cede its lighthouse until 1793—
three years after it had finally ratified the Constitution in May 1790.
However, the state was never cut off from federal lighthouse monies
because Congress passed a series of one-year extensions of its cession
deadline.75 Thus, even where push could potentially have come to shove,
the federal government kept the carrot of federal monies dangling a bit
longer and employed gentle behind the scenes lobbying rather than holding
firm to established deadlines.76
73

Samuel Adams to Elbridge Gerry, Sept. 1789 (undated), on file with the First
Federal Congress Project.
74
See Pennsylvania (Ch. LLII, Sept. 28, 1789); Virginia, (Ch. V, Nov. 13, 1789);
South Carolina (Jan. 20, 1790); New York (Ch. 3, Feb. 3, 1790); Connecticut (May 2,
1790); Massachusetts (June 10, 1790); North Carolina (Ch. II, Nov. 1790); New Hampshire
(Ch. 71, Feb. 14, 1791).
75
R.I. (May 1793). See 1st Cong., sess. II, ch. 32 (July 22, 1790); 1st Cong., sess. III,
ch. 24 (Mar. 3, 1791); 2nd Cong., sess. I, ch. 17 (Apr. 12, 1792).
76
Evidence suggests, not surprisingly, that the availability of federal monies was the
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The positive collective state response to the Lighthouse Act is
reflective of contentment with the Act’s broader implications: there was to
be a national lighthouse system, organized and controlled by the federal
government, with decisions on placement of new lighthouses made by
federal officials. What makes that apparent contentment particularly
interesting is that the Lighthouse Act itself did not provide the executive
branch with any general powers to construct lighthouses; nor did it assert
that Congress would exercise such general powers in the future. Other than
a specific provision for creation of one lighthouse in Chesapeake Bay, the
only ongoing duties went no further than maintenance and repair.77
Nonetheless, the ink had barely dried on the Lighthouse Act before a
merchant in Massachusetts wrote to George Washington asking the
government to construct a lighthouse on the island of Seguin.78
In short, the import of the Act was obvious—if the federal
government could (and would) build one lighthouse, it would build others.79
Within 15 years, the lighthouses’ place in the federal sphere of activity was
motivating factor for the states’ unanimous decisions to cede their lighthouses to the
federal government. See XXV State Records of North Carolina (Walter Clark ed.) (1906)
(Ch. 11 of the laws of 1790) (lighthouse cession specifically including a “whereas” clause
referring to the fact that “the funds heretofore appropriated by this state [for lighthouses]
are now vested in [Congress]….”); Notation on bill jacket for Massachusetts Lighthouse
Bill, and House Journal entry for June 8, 1790 (p.71), both on file at the Massachusetts
State Archives (ordering Commissary General to lay before the House an account of the
annual lighthouse expenses, before vote on bill to cede lighthouses).
77
Lighthouse Act, § 3. A draft version of the lighthouse bill would have imbued the
Secretary of the Treasury with the duty to provide by contracts, subject to Presidential
approval, for the “building or rebuilding” of lighthouses. However, the general power to
build was deleted, likely out of separation of powers concerns. V DHOFFC 1253.
78
Samuel Goodwin to George Washington, Nov. 25, 1789, reprinted in 4 Papers of
George Washington, Presidential Series at 323 (information about Goodwin appears at
p.302).
79
In June 1790, Joseph Whipple was appointed Superintendent of “the Light House at
the Mouth of Piscatqua River in your State as also of any others that may be erected in your
State.” Hamilton to Whipple, June 1, 1790, reprinted in VI Syrett at 452. See also, e.g.,
Newton to Hamilton, June 27, 1790, reprinted in VI Syrett at 474 (proposing lighthouse at
Old Point Comfort); George Heriot to Daniel Huger (with notations to send to Hamilton),
dated July 31, 1790 (NARA, RG 26, 17G, Box 1) (expressing that commissioners of port at
Georgetown, S.C., were sorry to learn that the law did not empower the Secretary of the
Treasury to build beacons, as well as repair them; they will depend on representatives to
bring the matter before Congress); Sam Mitchell to Hamilton, Dec. 3, 1792, XIII Syrett at
280 (expressing regret that no present new lighthouse is proposed, but stating that perhaps
“this part of our Coast may be considered and benefited in its Turn”); Hamilton to
Commissioners of Cape Fear, June 11, 1791, reprinted in VIII Syrett at 464 (stating that
Lighthouse Act did not extend further than repair and maintenance, but suggesting that
application to Congress for completion of their lighthouse at Cape Fear probably would
have met with success).
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solidified to the point that a House Committee could report that “The liberal
spirit with which these works have been carried on, is very honorable to the
national character.”80 Years later, Joseph Story suggested that we “ask
ourselves how it would be possible, without an efficient national
government, to provide adequately for the erection and support of
lighthouses, monuments, buoys, and other guards against shipwreck.”81
Considerations of spirit and necessity aside (accurate or not), federal
lighthouse construction and operation became ensconced as a legitimate
constitutional exercise of Commerce Clause authority. While other forms
of internal improvements faced persistent challenges, lighthouses remained
securely within the federal domain.82 Their potency as a symbol of federal
power was obvious. When John Quincy Adams tried to convince the nation
that the federal government should erect an astronomical observatory, he
referred to observatories as “light-houses of the skies.”83
Adams’ project, like so many other internal improvement projects,
failed (temporarily). But Adams was not the only one to attempt to latch on
to the precedent created by lighthouses. Throughout the key internal
improvement debates of the nation’s first forty years, lighthouses were
mentioned again and again. Supporters of federal improvement projects
touted lighthouses as supporting their interpretation of the Commerce
80

American State Papers, Comm. & Nav., vol. 1, ser. 14, no. 85 (Feb. 18, 1804)
(Report of the Committee of Commerce and Manufacturers on the resolution of the House
directing an inquiry to be made into the expediency of laying a tonnage duty upon vessels
entering our ports, for the support of Light Houses).
81
Story, supra note ___, at § 504. Note how this compares with Story’s agnosticism
on whether the Constitution gave the federal government the power to construct roads and
canals. See, supra, note ___.
82
See, e.g., Currie, 39 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. at 1500 and n.314 (noting that Jefferson
did not veto bills financing aids to maritime navigation despite doubts as to their
constitutionality). Even James Polk, a foe of federally-sponsored internal improvement
projects, carved out an exception for lighthouses in his veto message on a harbor and river
improvement act, based on the “long acquiesence of the government through all preceding
administrations” to a power exercised “coeval with the constitution.” 29th Cong., 1st sess.,
House Journal at 1210 (Aug. 3, 1846). Polk’s general constitutional theory regarding
internal improvements actually echoed the plan proposed long before by Thomas Tucker
during the Lighthouse Act debate: to Polk, Congress’ power was limited to giving or
withholding consent to state imposition of tonnage duties to fund internal improvements.
John C. Eastman, Restoring the “General” to the General Welfare Clause, 4 Chap. L. Rev.
73, 85 (Spring 2001).
83
Albert Castel, The Founding Fathers and the Vision of a National University, 4
History of Educ. Quart. 280, 295 (Dec. 1964). Allen Cole, who has researched Adams’
rhetoric, believes that Adams coined the phrase, though “there is at least one medieval
reference to observatories as lighthouses in the Picatrix.” E-mail from A.F. Cole,
University of Maryland, to the author, dated Sept. 10, 2003 (on file with the author).
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Clause. Opponents struggled with how best to avoid the force of such
precedent. Examination of the role of lighthouses in the major internal
improvement debates sheds light on how federal legislators in the early
years of the republic viewed the role of precedent in interpreting the
Constitution. As it turned out, the motives underlying the First Federal
Congress’ initial steps to take control of the nation’s lighthouses had no
impact on the precedential weight accorded to lighthouses as an exercise of
Commerce Clause authority.
B. Lighthouses and the use of legislative precedent in Constitutional
debates in the early republic
1. James Madison: From the Lighthouse Act of 1789 to a call for a
Constitutional Amendment
As evidenced by his role in the debate on the Tonnage Act in the
Spring of 1789, Madison was largely responsible for the federal
government’s foray into lighthouse operation. As President, he signed a
law authorizing the Secretary of the Treasury to purchase Winslow Lewis’
patent for lighting lighthouses and to contract with Lewis to outfit and
maintain the United States’ lighthouses for seven years. 84 And yet, setting
down his views in retirement in 1831, he expressed the need to empower
the federal government with a constitutional amendment covering “internal
improvements, embracing Roads, Canals, Light Houses, Harbours, Rivers,
and other lesser objects.” 85
That is not to say that Madison, looking back in 1831, could not also
justify lighthouse construction as an exercise of federal power. But the
justification he provided (in the same letter proposing the need for a
constitutional amendment embracing lighthouses) rested largely on past
practices rather than a bare reading of the Constitution:
Light Houses having a close and obvious
relation to navigation and external commerce,
and to the safety of public as well as private
ships, and having recd. a positive sanction and
general acquiescence from the
commencement of the Federal Government,
the constitutionality of them is I presume not

84

Papers of J. Madison, Pres. Series, vol. 4 at 252 (1999).
Madison to Reynolds Chapman, dated Jan. 6, 1831, reprinted in ___ Writings of
James Madison 429, 434.
85
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now to be shaken if it were ever much
contested.86
As President, Madison had explicitly stated that precedent could be
used to establish the validity of otherwise arguable constitutional
constructions. It was for that reason that he refused to veto the national
bank on constitutional grounds, even though he personally believed that the
bank was unconstitutional.87 How remarkable is it, therefore, for Madison
to call for a constitutional amendment covering lighthouses, despite decades
of legislative and executive precedent (including precedent he took part in
creating) that would make their constitutionality otherwise unshakeable?
Three facts will help us better understand Madison’s position in 1831:
When Jefferson was President, he remembered the Lighthouse Act
dissent that Madison had evidently forgotten about thirty years later. And
he shared the dissenters’ view. Though he questioned how the Commerce
Clause could justify creation of coastal navigational aids; though he could
not see any distinction between building such aids and building factories to
“facilitate” commerce (which he did not deem to be constitutional); and
though he believed a constitutional amendment was needed for the federal
government to build internal improvements—he nonetheless continued
signing lighthouse-related bills into law, apparently, as one historian has
concluded, out of a willingness “to let sleeping dogs lie….”88 As President,
Madison may well have taken the same approach.
Second, during Madison’s presidency, he had already concluded (as
Jefferson before him) that a constitutional amendment was needed for
internal improvements in general.89 Indeed, one of his final acts in office
was vetoing a bill intended to establish a permanent fund for internal
improvements.90 Madison’s veto message of the so-called “Bonus Bill”
86

Id. at 435.
In vetoing a recharter of the bank in 1815 on nonconstitutional grounds, Madison
stated that he was “waiving” the question of “constitutional authority” as being precluded
“by repeated recognitions under varied circumstances of the validity of such an institution
in acts of the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of the Government, accompanied
by indications, in different modes, of a concurrence of the general will of the nation . . . .”
Veto Message to the Senate of the United States, Jan. 30, 1815, reprinted in VIII Writings
of James Madison (Hunt, ed., 1908) 327.
88
David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress: Jefferson and the West, 1801-1809,
39 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1441, n.314 (1998).
89
John Lauritz Larson, “Bind the Republic Together”: The National Union and the
Struggle for a System of Internal Improvements, 74 J. Am. Hist., Issue 2, Sept. 1987, at 371
n.15, 376 n.24.
90
Bills and Resolutions, H.R. 29 (1816). Because the internal improvements fund was
to be financed by the “bonus” and dividends of the National Bank, the bill is often referred
87
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specifically rejected Commerce Clause authority for federal road and canal
building:
“The power to regulate commerce among the
several States,” cannot include a power to
construct roads and canals, and to improve the
navigation of watercourses, in order to
facilitate, promote, and secure such a
commerce, without a latitude of construction
departing from the ordinary import of the
terms, strengthened by the known
inconveniences which doubtless led to the
grant of this remedial power to Congress.”91
Madison’s message came after extended congressional debate on the
matter—debate in which supporters of the bill laid out legislative precedent
they deemed indicative of federal powers. Lighthouses had a prominent
place among that precedent.92 But Madison simply brushed all of the
proponents’ arguments aside by broadly stating that their position could not
be justified without “a reliance on insufficient precedents.”93 Though he
did not attempt to distinguish lighthouses from roads or canals, it may well
be that in 1817 (contrary to Jefferson) he saw such a distinction as
appropriate. However, it may also be true that by 1831 he was not
confident that any legitimate distinction existed. Which brings us back to
the 1831 letter, and our third point.
The reference in Madison’s letter to safety and external commerce
could logically extend to internal improvements other than lighthouses. In
fact, Madison recognized that canals could create channels for foreign
commerce; that roads could be necessary for troops and military
transportations (in which cases they “must speak for themselves, as
occasions arise”); and that rivers requiring removal of obstructions could
run the gamut from the Mississippi—“the commercial highway for half the
nation”—to “inconsiderable” streams within one state. 94 Conversely, he
hinted that not all proposed lighthouse projects may serve the national
purposes of foreign or interstate commerce. 95
to as the “Bonus Bill.”
91
30 Annals of Cong. 211-12 (1817). Madison also found that the law could not be
supported by the federal government’s power to provide for the common defense and
general welfare. Id. at 212.
92
30 Annals of Cong. 859 (1817) (Pickering), 869 (Yates), 889 (Sheffey), and 917
(Pickering).
93
Id. at 212.
94
Writings of James Madison at 435-36.
95
Id. at 435 (“the power is liable to great abuse, and [calls] for the most careful &
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That being the case, what distinction would remain between
lighthouses and other types of internal improvements? The crucial
categorical distinction in Madison’s letter would appear to be the course of
history: Lighthouses received “a positive sanction and general
acquiescence” since the beginning of the federal government; the other
forms of improvements did not. But if the only distinction between them
were precedent, and not logic, then allowing such “general acquiescence” to
remove the need for constitutional amendment could hardly be limited to
lighthouses only; logically, one would think the precedent should apply to
all analogous improvements. And so, perhaps, that is why Madison, firm in
his belief that road and canal building required an amendment, did not
exempt lighthouses from his call for an amendment even though they had
already attained an unshakable constitutional status built on precedent.96
By 1831, whether or not precedent could inform constitutional
construction, and whether or not the precedent of lighthouses were
indistinguishable from less well-established forms of internal
improvements, had been the subject of repeated debate in Congress.
2. The Use of Precedent in Internal Improvement Debates
By the time the Fourteenth Congress engaged in the drawn out
debate that preceded passage of the Bonus Bill, each side could point to
certain actions (or inactions) of prior governments as supporting their
interpretation of the Constitution.97 That Madison had recently sanctioned
construction of the Constitution based on precedent was not lost on
supporters of internal improvements. But opponents—neither then, nor in
responsible scrutiny into every particular case before an application be complied with”).
96
Madison’s letter refers the reader to his 1817 opinion denying the constitutionality
of internal improvements, explaining that his opinion is still the same “subject, as
heretofore, to the exception of particular cases, where a reading of the Constitution,
different from mine may have derived from a continued course of practical sanctions an
authority sufficient to overrule individual constructions.” Id. at 433-34. Lighthouses and
harbor clean-up projects are the only cases he mentions in the letter as having been
established by continued positive sanctions. Could Madison possibly be suggesting that he
himself, despite his comments in Congress during the Tonnage Act debate in 1789, did not
necessarily view lighthouses as a constitutional exercise of federal authority—that his view
on the matter had changed since 1789 (or even since his Presidency)? Indeed, Madison’s
earlier veto of the Bonus Bill has been interpreted as a shift by Madison from a more
flexible republicanism to a strict constructionalism that included a denunciation of his own
post road arguments from 20 years before that. John Lauritz Larson, “Bind the Republic
Together:” The National Union and the Struggle for a System of Internal Improvements,
74 Journal of Am. Hist. 363, 382 (Sept. 1987).
97
For a summary of the fits and starts of internal improvements prior to that point, see
Larson, Internal Improvement at 39-63.
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subsequent internal improvement debates—were not about to concede the
point. The key internal improvement debates over the next decade routinely
included argument over whether it was proper to afford any weight to
precedent in interpreting the Constitution.98
On one side of the debate, legislators expressed a fear that reliance
on precedent could result in amendment of the Constitution without
following Article V procedures. The following comment, made during the
Bonus Bill debate, is typical of such statements:
The authority to pass the bill, judging from
the arguments used, seems to be derived
rather from precedents than the Constitution.
This surely cannot be the true way to construe
that sacred instrument. . . . If precedents are
to be the rule of construction, the Constitution
may be altered without applying to the States;
and according to it, no amendment may be
made without their consent.99
98

Subjects of debate ranged from creating funds for making appropriations to support
internal improvements; to commission of general surveys for use in future construction of
internal improvements; to funding, investment in, or construction of specific individual
projects. See generally Larson, Internal Improvement at 63-69, Ch.4, and Ch. 5. Politics
and sectional/local interests played a large role in the debates, in votes, and in whether
legislation that made it through Congress ultimately was signed into law. However, debate
was not solely “political,” as the internal improvement issue found expression “as a
constitutional, and not merely a policy, question.” Harry N. Scheiber, The Transportation
Revolution and American Law: Constitutionalism and Public Policy, in Transportation and
the Early Nation 1, 3 (1982). For our purposes, the possible motives underlying the
constitutional arguments described are not as important as the nature of the dialogue itself.
Generally speaking, though, legislators in favor of internal improvements favored reliance
on precedent, and those opposed to improvements argued against the use of precedent to
provide meaning to the Constitution. Because the nature of the precedent debate did not
change over time during the period in question, and in fact was largely repetitive of itself,
regardless of the specific bill being debated, I have illustrated the debate with exemplary
comments from the various debates. The debate on the unsuccessful Buffalo to New
Orleans road, and the debate that led to Andrew Jackson’s veto of the Maysville Road
bill—both critical blows to attempts to create a federal transportation system, and both of
which occurred just prior to Madison’s 1831 letter—seemed an appropriate ending point
for this inquiry into early nineteenth century congressional debate. See Pamela L. Baker,
The Washington National Road Bill and the Struggle to Adopt a Federal System of Internal
Improvement, 22 J. of the Early Republic 438; John C. Eastman, Restoring the “General”
to the General Welfare Clause, 4 Chapman L. Rev. 63, 83 (2001); for additional
background on the period see Larson, Internal Improvement at 183-91.
99
30 Annals of Cong. 178 (1817)(Hardin). See, e.g., 31 Annals of Cong. 1139
(1818)(A. Smyth) (if precedent is unconstitutional, that is not grounds for acting
unconstitutionally now); 5 Reg. Deb. 254 (1829)(Barbour: new power requires
amendment).
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Such argument against precedent really had two components: First, a
concern over the nature of the American Constitution and a rejection of
eighteenth century conceptions of constitutional change. As Virginia’s
Alexander Smyth put it, if Congressional power could be extended by
construction, then the Constitution “will be no better than that of England,
where the rule of construction is, that whatever has been done may be done
again.”100
Second, those arguing against reliance on precedent were concerned
about the legislature’s appropriate place among the three co-ordinate
branches of federal government: “Gentlemen have said that Congress, by
its enactments, has settled the constitutional power of the Government in
relation to internal improvements. Can Congress confer a new power? Can
Congress rule the Constitution?”101 This was not just a question of whether
Congress had the ability to resolve Constitutional questions. The role of a
legislature, said Virginia’s Philip P. Barbour, was fundamentally different
from that of a court. Whereas courts rely on precedent in order to have a
fixed rule of construction, Barbour argued, it is the legislature’s role to
declare what the law shall be—not what it is. That is, legislatures can pass
laws that change prior ones, and should not be bound by what came
before.102
Internal improvement supporters met the opponents on every front.
With respect to the Article V issue, by 1830 they were even partially aided
by Alexander Smyth, who had changed his earlier views on precedent and
was now willing to concede that relying on precedent to establish the
practice of appropriating money for internal improvement projects did not
subvert the amendment process because repeated legislative practice
constituted a construction of the Constitution by the people’s
representatives, implicitly sanctioned by the people themselves.103 Indeed,
100

31 Annals of Cong. 1146 (1818.) (Smyth, A.); id. at 1163 (Barbour)(distinguishing
the United States from Britain).
101
6 Reg. Deb. 730 (1830) (Angel); 31 Annals of Cong. 1227 (1818) (Johnson)
(questioning whether “usurpation of power” by the legislature that “has not been resisted
by force” should be permitted to amount to legislative adjudication).
102
31 Annals of Cong. 1163 (1818).
103
6 Reg. Deb. 680 (1830) (Smyth). That concept is an echo of federalism arguments
made during the founding. Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political
Safeguards of Federalism, 100 Col. L. Rev. 1, 263-64 (2000). Despite his sanctioning of
repeated Congressional action as having the approval of both the state legislatures and the
people, Smyth did pointedly query whether ¾ of the state legislatures would actually admit
the power to appropriate funds for road building—suggesting he was not completely
comfortable with his own argument. As for federal construction of roads, Smyth still
maintained his constitutional objection to such action, as he saw no precedent establishing
a different interpretation.
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ignoring the different hurdles for passing laws and passing amendments,
one Congressman suggested that any improper assertion of power by the
national government could be changed by amendment—and a failure to
exercise that amendment power signified a “fair presumption” that the
power had not been improperly asserted.104
But more fundamentally, those in favor of reliance on legislative
precedent contended that reliance did not trigger Article V concerns because
each legislative act (whether past or present) was no more than
Congressional interpretation of the Constitution—and Congress was (in
their view) fully authorized to engage in such interpretive behavior. As one
member of the House put it, Congress was obligated to decide the
constitutional question “according to our conscience, and not refer the
matter to State decision.”105 There was no provision in the Constitution, he
added, referring doubtful questions to the States.106
In that regard, pro-precedent speakers equated Congressional power
to judicial powers of interpretation. For example, one representative,
pointing out that courts do not pass judgment on every piece of legislation
that gets enacted, argued that where the legislature itself must judge a law’s
validity, it should be able to make use of the same interpretive tools
available to the judiciary:
An appropriation of money to particular
objects may be effected by a bill, which may
happen to be carried into execution without
passing the ordeal of an examination by the
judiciary. But, after gentlemen admit that the
judiciary may decide on our Constitutional
powers, that the judiciary, in making that
decision, will adhere to precedents, and,
consequently, that precedents have authority
whenever an impartial and learned umpire can
intervene with its authority; will they contend
that, in every case where peculiar
circumstances enable us to carry a measure
into execution without the aid of the judiciary,
and where, of course, we must determine the
104

32 Annals of Cong. 1326 (1818) (Tucker). Another member of the Virginia
delegation expressed a fear that invoking the amendment process as a mode of
constitutional construction could itself create a harmful precedent. 31 Annals of Cong.
1286 (Mercer).
105
Id. at 1120 (Tucker).
106
Id.

36

Adam Grace

[18-Mar-04]

validity of the power ourselves, precedents
are to be rejected? How happens it that
precedent shall have force in settling the
validity of one Constitutional power, and be
rejected when the question arises on
another?107
Indeed, the equation of legislative precedent to judicial precedent was so
strong that one debater went so far as to say that “res judicata” foreclosed
the opponents’ arguments.108
Which is not to say that the supporters of precedent were not wary
of pressing the point too far. Although they could point to Madison’s
position on the national bank to justify reliance on precedent, they still had
to wrestle with the problem of whether an unconstitutional “error” could
somehow become constitutional simply by dint of having been enacted and
enforced. Those who opposed reliance on precedent illustrated the point by
invoking the Alien and Sedition laws—laws that no one at the time would
be eager to sanction with precedential authority.109 Speakers on the other
side of the debate staked out a more defensible stance enabling them to
deflect such concerns: precedent did not replace the “positive and written
principles of the Constitution;” rather it furnished “better evidence of the
true interpretation of the Constitution than the most refined and subtle
arguments.”110 No doubt having the solid precedent of coastal navigational
aids in mind, one legislator characterized prior practices as “landmarks for
subsequent legislatures”—“the buoys which the wisdom of the nation has
fixed, to mark out the channel that divides the rival jurisdictions.”111

107

32 Annals of Cong. 1341 (1818)(Pindall). See also 31 Annals of Cong. 1131
(1818)(executive and legislative exercise of power may be considered “so many decisions
on the instrument or law itself”) (emphasis added) (B. Smith).
108
30 Annals of Cong. 878 (1817)(Gold) (“is everything to be in flux and the benefit
of precedent to have no place here?”); see 32 Annals of Cong. 1343 (1818)(Pindall)
(stating that the “unusual course” of denying precedent all authority is a “position
involving the endless absurdity of forcing us to ten thousand decisions of a Constitutional
question, which, after all, according to [that] theory would leave the same question
undecided through all futurity”).
109
Id. at 168 (Daggett), 178 (Macon); 31 Annals of Cong. 1229-30 (1818)(Johnson).
110
30 Annals of Cong. 856 (1817)(Calhoun); see also 32 Annals of Cong. 1325
(1818)(Tucker: “I do not contend . . . that we are bound by legislative precedents against
the clear meaning of the Constitution. But I do contend, that when a principle has been
long avowed and admitted, and acted upon, we ought not entirely to disregard it in deciding
on a doubtful point.”); 31 Annals of Cong. 1176 (1818) (Clay: agreeing that prior exercise
of power should not answer the issue).
111
32 Annals of Cong. 1325 (1818)(Tucker).
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In sum, the internal improvement debates reflect years of repeated
disputes over the nature of the Constitution, the force of legislative
precedent, and Congress’ role in interpreting the Constitution and causing
Constitutional change. Alexander Smyth’s personal shift from 1818 to
1830 is reflective of the overall direction in which Congress was heading,
though there were still dissenters.
But even as those questions were being debated, the “landmarks”
and “buoys” of lighthouses and other navigational aids continued pushing
the Commerce Clause debate. Even those opposed to reliance on precedent
had to contend with the fact that every Congress since the very first one had
provided for them. The reality of the situation was that the parameters of
the Commerce Clause had already moved; the real question to be fought
over was by how much.112
3. Lighthouse
As
Commerce
Clause
Precedent
Defining “Regulate” To Include The Power To “Facilitate”

For

For those who believed that the Commerce Clause did not empower
the federal government to create internal improvements, an obvious focal
point was the meaning of the word “regulate.”113 But those who would
contend that regulate meant simply to prescribe rules for, and not to
112

Over the years, additional non-lighthouse precedents were developed, most
prominent among them being the Cumberland Road, whose origins stemmed from a
compact that created the state of Ohio. Leonard D. White, The Jeffersonians 484 (1959).
Though the slow but sure accretion of road and canal-related precedents was significant,
debaters in favor of improvements supported the projects with additional powers besides
the Commerce Clause (such as military, postal, or spending clause powers), while those
opposed to improvements had numerous grounds for distinguishing them (e.g. they
involved appropriations, or federal investments, rather than federal construction; or they
were put in place without any constitutional debate). Such distinctions often provided the
constitutional basis for individual and congressional determinations. See Larson, Internal
Improvement at 118 (table of resolutions voted on by the 15th Congress; power to
appropriate funds for improvements was approved; power to build roads or canals was
rejected); Eastman, Restoring the “General” to the General Welfare Clause, 4 Chapman L.
Rev. 63, 82-3 (2001) (noting Monroe’s change of mind on the constitutionality of
appropriations for internal improvements); 6 Reg. Deb. 680 (Smyth) (finding precedent
supporting spending, but not construction). Because the federal lighthouse system was
almost universally accepted as an exercise of Commerce Clause authority, and because it
represented the most repeated, unchallenged, precedent for construction of, and not just
appropriations for, internal improvements, the development of Commerce Clause precedent
is seen most clearly through legislator’s comments about lighthouses. That is not to say,
however, that other precedent had no influence on the issues discussed with respect to
lighthouses.
113
See, e.g., statements that to “regulate” did not mean to “facilitate”: 30 Annals of
Cong. 897 (1817); 31 Annals of Cong. 1133 (1818); id. at 1139; id. at 1158.
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facilitate, faced a significant problem: the routine construction and
operation of lighthouses belied such a narrow reading of the Commerce
Clause.114 Whatever theoretical arguments could be formulated against the
use of precedent, the problem for those who opposed federal road and canal
programs was that they had simultaneously been party to Congress’
continued support of lighthouses. If they could not logically distinguish
their views on the different categories of improvements, all the
constitutional theory in the world was not going to help their cause.
And so, the debate shifted beyond the meaning of “regulate” to
include argument on the scope of regulated activity. To argue in the face of
lighthouse precedent that Congress could not “facilitate” commerce was
almost impossible. Instead (though perhaps not much less difficult of an
argument), internal improvement opponents tried to draw the best bright
line they could between lighthouses and roads and canals. Thus, they
characterized lighthouse building as an appropriate exercise of Commerce
Clause authority because it concerned the regulation of foreign (or
“external”) commerce.115
The external/internal commerce distinction could perhaps have had
practical merit (for example, in weeding out proposed improvements that
might only serve local, rather than national, interests). And it certainly
could explain why the federal government needed to be involved in
lighthouse construction (given the importance of national control over
anything that could impact foreign trade). But as a matter of Constitutional
interpretation, Congressmen on the other side of the debate had little trouble
pointing out the lack of textual support for a distinction between foreign and
interstate commerce.116 This retort by then-Federalist Joseph Hemphill of
Pennsylvania was typical:
To regulate commerce with foreign nations . .
. we have erected lighthouses, piers, buoys,
and beacons. . . .
What is the object of these lighthouses and
light-ships, and this class of powers
constantly exercised by Congress? Is it not to
114

See, e.g., citations to lighthouses as precedent for power to facilitate commerce: 30
Annals of Cong. 869 (1817); id. at 889-90; 31 Annals of Cong. 1131 (1818); id. at 1176; id.
at 1189; 40 Annals of Cong. 621 (1823); id. at 1106; 6 Reg. Deb. 644 (1830); id. at 662.
115
See, e.g., 30 Annals of Cong. 864 (1817); 31 Annals of Cong.. at 1139 (1818); see
also 6 Reg. Deb. 699 (1830) (characterizing pre-1815 federal government as focused on
external affairs, and decrying as “internal and essentially vicious” federal action since
then).
116
See, e.g., 31 Annals of Cong. 457 (1818); id. at 1131; id. at 1176; 5 Reg. Deb. 27980 (1829); 6 Reg. Deb. 644 (1830); id. at 662.
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lessen the price of transportation, by
removing dangers and rendering the
navigation more safe and secure? . . . And
when we find the power to regulate commerce
among the States, given by the same sentence,
and expressed by the same words, why can
we not apply the principle to the regulation of
commerce among the States? Why can we
not lessen the price of transportation? Can
any man living make a sensible distinction?117
Picking up on the flawed distinction between foreign and interstate
commerce, Henry Clay attacked the apparent self-interested bias of
representatives from coastal states who routinely benefited from lighthouses
but would now invoke the Constitution to deny roads and canals to the rest
of the country.118 For Clay, it was not so much a matter of adherence to
precedent, but a matter of Congressional fairness. If the government
exercised its power for one interest, it should not say that the power cannot
be exercised for another analogous interest: Having erected lighthouses to
facilitate foreign commerce, Congress had a “bounden duty” to either repeal
all the lighthouse laws (if they truly were unconstitutional) or enact similar
ones to benefit internal commerce.119
Repeal of lighthouse laws did not happen.120 For complicated
reasons, including not just Congressional but Presidential politics, the
national government moved slowly in providing the fairness sought by Clay
117

40 Annals of Cong. 621 (1823).
31 Annals of Cong. 1169 (1818)(“Foreign commerce … is the spoilt child daughter
of this Government. We deck her out in the most precious and costly jewels; we light up
her way by Winslow Lewis’ inventions . . . But when the old respectable matron
Agriculture asks us for something for her accommodation, gentlemen will not give her a
gown even of Virginia cloth.”). See also 6 Reg. Deb. 711 (1830) (“it does seem to me that
some gentlemen think that constitution, commerce, and every thing stops with tide water”).
A regional breakdown of the voting on a series of internal improvement-related resolutions
in the Fifteenth Congress can be found in Larson, Internal Improvements at 118.
119
31 Annals of Cong. 1176 (1818). Though of course politically motivated, Clay’s
theory that Congress should apply the Constitution fairly to all parties is in essence a
statement of “legislative adjudication:” whether or not precedent could be deemed
“binding” under the Constitution, it was imperative that Congressional resolutions (or
“adjudications”) of similar funding issues be consistent with each other. See, supra, note
___.
120
Even James Polk, the staunchest Presidential enemy of internal improvement
projects, carved out an exception for lighthouses. See, supra, note ___. Though Andrew
Jackson before him expressed fears over abuses in lighthouse projects, he also did not
categorically reject them.
118
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and other supporters of broad internal improvement programs.121 But the
fits and starts in putting in place a national system of roads and canals
should not obscure the way the constitutional debate had shifted in the
meantime. The foundation for defining the power to “regulate” commerce
as including the power to “facilitate” was firmly laid with the Lighthouse
Act of 1789. Unless Congress were either to reverse course or afford no
precedential value to its steady legislative practices, those arguing that
“regulate” meant no more than to “prescribe” or “direct” would face an
uphill battle.122
The locus for the early solidification of Commerce Clause authority
is generally placed in Justice Marshall’s hands.123 Interestingly enough,
members of Congress used Marshall’s opinion in Gibbons v. Ogden to
support their argument that construction of lighthouses and other internal
improvements could not constitute the exercise of Commerce Clause power
because (as Marshall had said) states and individuals could engage in such
activities, too.124 The neutralization of that portion of Marshall’s opinion
came through the other branches’ giving definition to the word “regulate”
through the continuous enactment of lighthouse-related laws, supported by
repeated reliance on the Commerce Clause as their authority for doing so.
II.

EARLY FEDERAL LIGHTHOUSE ADMINISTRATION AND THE
DEVELOPMENT OF EMINENT DOMAIN LAW

As we saw above, the Lighthouse Act’s provision for state consent
stemmed from the Enclave Clause, which provided a mechanism for the
federal acquisition of exclusive jurisdiction over property within state
boundaries. When the federal government took over the existing
lighthouses starting in 1789, the individual states ceded both title and
jurisdiction to the federal government simultaneously. But as the federal
lighthouse program grew in the 1790s, and new lighthouses were
constructed, the states did not always own title to the property on which the
121

See generally Larson, Internal Improvement at 45-69, 109-93; Stephen Minicucci,
The “Cement of Interest,” 25 Social Science History 247 (2001).
122
Regarding the weight placed on non-judicial Constitutional precedent, it is worth
noting that even opponents of internal improvements ended up relying on precedent-based
arguments. Thus, Alexander Smyth contended that the “long nonuser” of a power to build
roads is “evidence that it is not contained in the [Constitution’s] grant; and we should now
consider it as settled, that Congress have not power to enter into a state, assume
jurisdiction, and construct roads.” 6 Reg. Deb. 680 (1830). See id. at 766 (Hubbard).
123
Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. (22 U.S.) 1 (1824).
124
32 Annals of Cong. 1358 (1818)(Orr); 6 Reg. Deb. 839-40 (1830). See also
Gibbons at __ (“What is this power? It is the power to regulate; that is, to prescribe the
rule by which commerce is to be governed.”).
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federal government wished to build. That state of affairs potentially raised
two questions: If a private land owner refused to transfer its land, did the
federal government have power to obtain title through condemnation? If so,
could a state affect the federal government’s rights by refusing to cede
jurisdiction over the property in question?
Fast forward to 1875. In Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367 (1875),
the Supreme Court conclusively ruled that the federal government had the
power to take private property (provided, of course, that just compensation
is made in accordance with the Fifth Amendment.125 And case law from the
period clearly distinguished between federal acquisition of soil (which a
state could not prevent) and federal acquisition of jurisdiction (which
required state consent) 126—effectively meaning thatif the federal
government did want “exclusive” jurisdiction, it would have to comply with
the wishes of a state that refused to cede jurisdiction if eminent domain
powers were exercised.
The question is, what happened in the 86 years between the birth of
constitutional government and the Supreme Court’s pronouncement in
1875. Was it understood that the federal government could take property by
eminent domain? If not, why not?
A. The Enclave Clause’s Effect On Precedent
On September 6, 1797, a group of men gathered at Webbs Tavern in
Salem, Massachusetts, for a boat ride to nearby Baker’s Island. The group
included the United States Superintendent of Lighthouses in Massachusetts,
an attorney for the owner of Baker’s Island, and the members of a
committee appointed by a state court judge “to view, sett off and appraise”
ten acres of land on the island, for use by the United States as a site for a
new lighthouse. Foul weather prevented the group from undertaking their
trip, but less than a week later the committee members succeeded in
viewing the land and arriving at an appropriate appraised value.127 In
October, the state court accepted the committee’s report, 128 and the United

125

Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367 (1875).
See, e.g., Ex Parte Hebard, 11 F. Cas. 1010, 1011 (D. Kan. 1877) (state consent not
required for valid exercise of eminent domain, but state shall not be ousted of jurisdiction
except by her consent); Stockton v. Baltimore & N.Y. R.R., 32 F. 9, 18 (D.N.J.
1887)(same).
127
The court document setting forth all of this information can be found at pages 20506 of NARA Microfilm Roll M94.
128
Id.
126
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States completed what may well have been its first taking of private
property.
As history unfolded, the Baker’s Island taking bore two
characteristics that would be repeated for decades: the valuation process
was overseen by a state court, and it was explicitly authorized not by act of
Congress, but by the Massachusetts state law ceding jurisdiction over
whatever land would become the Baker’s Island lighthouse.129 Indeed,
according to the established history of takings, up until the 1870s the
exercise of federal eminent domain power within state borders occurred
generally in state proceedings and always with state legislative
involvement—a pattern of conduct not altered until the Supreme Court’s
Kohl decision upheld a federal court condemnation proceeding and strongly
confirmed the federal government’s independent power of eminent
domain.130 This large gap in time from the founding to the 1870s has been
129

The statute reads, in relevant part:
Be it enacted . . . That the United States of America, may purchase or
take as hereinafter is provided, any tracts of Land which shall be found
necessary and convenient for the Light-houses authorized by Congress
to be erected upon Baker’s Island, and upon Cape Cod . . . .
...
And be it further enacted, That if the Agent or person employed for the
United States, and the Owner or Owners of any Tract or Tracts of Land
which shall be found necessary and convenient for the said Light-houses
cannot agree in a sale and purchase thereof, such Agent or Person
employed may apply to any Court of General Sessions of the Peace
which shall be holden within and for the county wherein such land
lies, who shall and may appoint a Committee, of three Freeholders,
impartial men, to determine a just equivalent to the Owner or Owners
of such Land, which committee shall be sworn before some Justice
of the Peace for the faithful discharge of their trust; and shall forthwith
proceed to view, set off and appraise such Tract or Tracts of Land; and
shall make return of their doings to the same Court; and which award
and return being accepted by the Court and the amount of such
appraisement being paid to the Owner or Owners of the Land appraised
and set off by such Committee . . . the Tract or Tracts of Land so
appraised and set off, shall be vested in the United States, and shall
and may be taken, possessed and appropriated for the purposes
aforesaid. Provided, That all charges of such application and
appraisement shall be paid by the United States, and Provided that
the Land which may be set off for the purposes of this Act, shall
not exceed the quantity of ten acres in the whole for each Lighthouse,
including and reckoning therewith, any Land purchased for the same.

Mass., ch. 23, June 18, 1796.
130
Julius L. Sackman, 1 Nichols on Eminent Domain (revised 3d ed.) § 1.24 (2002);
Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367 (1875). From early on, however, federal takings power
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attributed to the presence of doubt regarding whether or not the federal
government possessed eminent domain power.131 It is a theory that bears
re-examination.
On the one hand, it is true that the federal government’s power to
take property within state borders, without state consent, was questioned by
some during the 19th century. Even James Monroe, in arguing against
federal authority to construct internal improvements, suggested that “very
few would concur” that the federal government, in attempting to obtain land
for purposes of internal improvement projects, could summon a jury to
condemn the land and compel a transfer for value.132 But it is difficult to
believe that federal officials in the 1790s would not have understood the
(recently enacted) “just compensation” limitation of the Takings Clause as
an implicit recognition of federal eminent domain power.133 That is the
only sensible reading of the clause, and two Supreme Court Justices
explicitly recognized the power in 1798—one of them stating that the
absence of such a power would obstruct the operations of government
because “Fortifications, Light-houses, and other public edifices, are
necessarily sometimes built upon the soil owned by individuals.”134
was routinely exercised in federal court when the land being acquired was situated within
the District of Columbia. 1 Nichols at § 1.24.
131
As the lead treatise on Eminent Domain explains: “Originally there was some
doubt with respect to the power of eminent domain in the federal government since, it was
argued, the United States is a government of delegated powers and the power of eminent
domain had not been specifically granted in the federal constitution.” 1 Nichols at § 1.24.
See Gary Lawson and Guy Seidman, Taking Notes: Subpoenas and Just Compensation, 66
U. Chi. L. Rev. 1081, 1087 n.18 (“The existence of a federal power of eminent domain was
a matter of some controversy in the founding era.”); William B. Stoebuck, A General
Theory of Eminent Domain, 47 Wash. L. Rev. 553, 559 n.18 (Aug. 1972) (“Strangely, it
was not until [the Kohl] decision that the federal government was clearly determined to
have eminent domain power.”).
132
VI Writings of James Monroe (Stanislaus Murray Hamilton, ed.) 216, 233 (“Views
on the Subject of Internal Improvements”). See, e.g., 31 Annals of Cong. 1209 (1818
)
(Austin); 32 Annals of Cong. 1351 (Orr); 40 Annals of Cong. 709 (1823) (Wood). See also
Gilmer v. Lime Point, 18 Cal. 229 (1861) (counsel argued that the United States lacks the
right of eminent domain without State consent; court noted it was not deciding the issue).
133
See Matthew P. Harrington, “Public Use” and the Original Understanding of the
So-Called “Takings” Clause, 53 Hastings L.J. 1245, 1287 (Aug. 2002) (stating that “far
from being a grant of power, Madison’s eminent domain clause was an attempt to define
the nature of a power already inhering in the national legislature”).
134
Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 400 (1798) (Iredell, J.). In Calder, Justices Chase and
Iredell both referred to the government’s power to take property as a reason for limiting the
scope of the Constitution’s prohibition against ex post facto laws. Id. at 394 (Chase, J.);
400 (Iredell, J., concurring in result). Although the case involved an act by a state
legislature, both justices applied their reasoning to the federal government’s powers:
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Moreover, although the evidence is scant, early lighthouse-related
correspondence of Treasury Department officials suggests that they did
understand themselves to be empowered to take property without state
consent or state-mandated procedures.135
It is beyond the scope of this article to identify the reasons that some
nineteenth century politicians either doubted federal eminent domain
authority, or simply refrained from exercising it in court proceedings
without state involvement. However, it is likely that both political thinking
and policy were significantly shaped by the Enclave Clause’s requirement
that the federal government obtain state consent before exercising exclusive
jurisdiction over federal lands.136 Indeed, the procedural pattern established
by the Baker Island taking arose out of the Enclave Clause’s consent
requirement. And it is a pattern that outlasted the Kohl case, being used
even after the Supreme Court had approved independent federal takings in
federal court.137 We turn now to examine the birth of that pattern.

It is not to be presumed, that the federal or state legislatures will pass
laws to deprive citizens of rights vested in them by existing laws; unless
for the benefit of the whole community; and on making full satisfaction.
The restraint against making any ex post facto laws was not considered,
by the framers of the constitution, as extending to prohibit the depriving
a citizen even of a vested right to property; or the provision, ‘that private
property should not be taken for PUBLIC use, without just compensation,’
was unnecessary.
Id. at 394 (Chase, J.); see id. at 400 (Iredell, J.).
135
See, infra, ____.
136
See 31 Annals of Cong. 1135 (Clagett) (saying that federal government could not
take possession of land—or even purchase it—without state consent). During the 1864
debates of Maryland’s (new) Constitutional Convention, the Enclave Clause’s requirement
of state consent was cited as support for an argument that the federal government did not
have the power to condemn lands within a state absent state consent. Debates of the
Constitutional Convention of the State of Maryland, vol. I at 458. See also Cong. Globe
(Apr. 19, 1860) at 1790-92 (Senate debate regarding bill that would have established a
procedure for taking property, with consent of the state legislature); Mark L. Pollot, Grand
Theft and Petit Larceny: Property Rights in America 44 (1993) (stating that the federal
Constitution does not expressly grant the power of eminent domain, unless one considers
the Enclave Clause “to be a modified extension of the power of eminent domain”); Ellen
Paul Frankel, Property Rights and Eminent Domain 73 (1987) (stating that the Enclave
Clause “appeared to limit federal takings to an indirect course, one that would require the
‘Consent of the Legislature of the State’ in which the property lies.”).
137
See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 109 U.S. 513, 520-21 (1883) (noting two examples
of recent state legislation providing for takings to be exercised in accordance with state
law); In re Petition of the United States, 96 N.Y. 227 (1884) (stating that despite its
independent condemnation powers, federal government may enter state courts and
condemn land through proceedings authorized by the state legislature).
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In the 1790s, when the federal government obtained either existing
lighthouse lands or lands for new lighthouse construction, it always sought
a jurisdictional cession over such lands from the state.138 The state acts
providing such cession sometimes included conditions accompanying the
state’s consent.139 The 1796 act passed by the Massachusetts General Court
with respect to Baker’s Island was no different in that regard.
In reading the act’s provision that the United States may “purchase
or take [land on Baker’s Island] as hereinafter is provided,” it would be
natural to view that provision as a grant of takings power to the federal
government.140 But the key words are “as hereinafter is provided.”
Massachusetts was not granting power to the United States—it was limiting
it. If land was to be taken by the federal government, state mandated
procedures would have to be adhered to, including a requirement that all
charges related to the appraisement proceeding by paid by the United
States.141 And, of course, the state’s power to impose these conditions on
the federal government stemmed directly from the power under the Enclave
Clause to withhold its consent to federal jurisdiction.
When the federal government set out to obtain land for the Baker’s
Island light, the official in charge was Tench Coxe, then Commissioner of
Revenue in the Treasury Department.142 Despite the clear process provided
138

See, e.g., Act of Apr. 12, 1792, ch. 12, 2d Cong., 1st sess.; T. Coxe to A. Hamilton,
Jan. 19, 1793, reprinted in XIII Syrett 503; House Journal, 3d Cong., 1st sess., p.46 (Jan.
21, 1794); Act of Mar. 2, 1795, ch. 40, 3rd Cong., 2d sess.; T. Coxe to Isaac Holmes, June
15, 1796 (NARA M63, roll 1).
139
See, e.g., Mass. Statutes 1790, ch. 4 (June 10, 1790) (conditioning cession on state
retention of jurisdiction for service of process, continued federal operation of the lights,
and compensation for lands ceded if other states given the same); V Statutes at Large of
South Carolina (Cooper ed.) 147 (1839) (Act No. 1486, Jan. 20, 1790) (U.S. must maintain
lights in good repair, and place leading marks and buoys); Laws of Virginia (Henning, ed.),
1789 ch. 5 (Nov. 19, 1789) (cession conditioned upon U.S. completing erection of light in
seven years).
140
Mass. Ch. XXIII, June 18, 1796.
141
Id. At the time, it could not have been clear to the Massachusetts legislature what
procedures the federal government might have followed had it attempted to take the land.
Takings were generally understood to be an exercise of legislative authority, with
compensation and procedures governed by legislative, not judicial, rule. Matthew P.
Harrington, “Public Use” and the Original Understanding of the So-Called “Takings”
Clause, 53 Hastings L.J. 1245, 1247, 1263, 1277 (Aug. 2002); William Michael Treanor,
The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and the Political Process, 95 Colum. L.
Rev. 782, 794 n.69 (1995); Jacques B. Gelin and David W. Miller, The Federal Law of
Eminent Domain §1.2 (1982). Indeed, the Massachusetts statute is a typical example of
that.
142
In a wonderful bit of irony, Coxe was the “Freeman” who penned the articles
assuring nervous readers that the Constitution did not empower the federal government to
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by the Massachusetts statute, Coxe was not at all anxious to resort to
condemnation. As he told his superintendent of lighthouses in
Massachusetts, “[i]t will be much more agreeable to procure the land by
treaty and ordinary purchase than to adopt the mode of valuation or
condemnation to the Public use, for an appraised consideration, as
authorized by the State law.”143
The concern was not one of federal-state relations (the state
legislature had already given its stamp of approval to condemnation) but
one of federal-private citizen relations. Although Coxe was always anxious
to keep costs down, including acquiring lands by gift if at all possible, his
correspondence also reflects vigilance in avoiding any behavior that would
make the federal government appear unfair in dealing with members of the
public.144 Thus, even when push eventually came to shove at Baker’s
Island and Coxe had to authorize use of Massachusetts’ takings procedure,
he authorized the lighthouse superintendent to agree “to give what three
good men will fix upon it,” if that were “more agreeable” to the owner than
the non-consensual condemnation proceeding; and he also specified that
“[r]ather than incommode him, half an acre may be taken.”145
From the Baker’s Island correspondence alone, it is not entirely
clear whether Coxe would have considered himself empowered to condemn
the land absent the Massachusetts’ statute. Indeed, he had just allowed his
superintendent in New York to be put through the ringer of exceedingly
difficult negotiations with the owners of land in Montauk, without any
indication that he could, if he wished, simply resort to a condemnation
proceeding.146 However, in February 1797—after Coxe was familiar with
engage in such traditional state activities as building lighthouses. See supra note __.
143
Tench Coxe to Benjamin Lincoln, dated July 8, 1796 (NARA microfilm role M63,
roll 1).
144
Tench Coxe to Nicholas Fish, dated May 27, 1795 (NARA microfilm roll M63, roll
1) (regarding land for Montauk lighthouse: “It is true, that the land in this instance appears
to be above the medium quality of the Sea Coast, and therefore it is more agreeable, that a
Nation should pay a reasonable price, than accept a small gift from Individuals”); Tench
Coxe to Peleg Coffin, dated July 29, 1795 (NARA microfilm roll M63, roll 1) (writing to
an oil seller haggling over price: “The Treasury has no interest in this Business. We form
our minds as the equitable arbitrators between the Community and the Citizen.”); Tench
Coxe to Nicholas Fish, dated Sept. 12, 1795 (NARA microfilm roll M63, roll 1) (“the
Government do not wish to obtain the land below its just value”); Tench Coxe to Benjamin
Lincoln, dated Dec. 20, 1796 (NARA microfilm roll M63, roll 1) (saying that quantity of
land could be reduced if desired by the owner “[i]n order to make the matter as little
inconvenient to the owner as possible”).
145
Tench Coxe to Benjamin Lincoln, Mar. 1, 1797 (NARA microfilm roll M63, roll
1).
146
See correspondence from Tench Coxe to Nicholas Fish, dated Apr. 10, 1795; May
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the Baker’s Island statute, and just as things were heating up with the
Baker’s Island owner—Coxe instructed his superintendent of lighthouses in
Rhode Island to consider condemning the land on which the Newport
Lighthouse was situated:
It is wished, that you would endeavor to
procure the Soil:—
1st by treaty with the owner, or
2dly by taking measures to procure the land
upon a just valuation of a Jury under the
authority of law, in that manner which is
understood to be called “condemning land” in
the Eastern states.—147
What makes Coxe’s suggestion significant is that at the time he
made it, Rhode Island had already ceded jurisdiction over the property, and
there was no Rhode Island statute authorizing or consenting to a
condemnation proceeding by the United States. Whether Baker’s Island
planted the seed of eminent domain in Coxe’s mind, or whether after both
Montauk and Baker’s Island his patience had worn thin, Coxe’s Newport
letter indicates that at the time it was written (1) Coxe did not view state
consent as a prerequisite to federal exercise of eminent domain power; and
(2) once the state had consented to a cession of jurisdiction—the only object
for which state consent is required by the Constitution—resort to
condemnation would not cause Coxe to return to the state legislature for
additional approval. Neither of which is to say that Coxe felt unconstrained
in using federal condemnation power. He did feel constrained—but the
constraints appear to have stemmed from a fear of antagonizing private
citizens, rather than from a belief that the federal government lacked power
without state legislative consent.148
26, 1795; Sept. 12, 1795 (NARA microfilm roll M63, roll 1). In the last letter, Coxe,
authorized his superintendent to raise their offer, but his exasperation at the owners’
“unhandsome conduct” was clearly reaching its limits:
But as good and reasonable men should abide by their own offers
or first askings, and as the Government do not wish to obtain the
land below its just value, it is earnestly hoped, that no obligation
may be imposed by the owners upon the Government to give a
price which may render them apparently inattentive to the proper
value of things and careless of the Public Money.
147
Tench Coxe to Wm Ellery, Feb. 28, 1797 (NARA microfilm roll M63, roll 1).
148
Coxe’s letter regarding the Newport lighthouse stresses that it is “particularly
desirable” not to resort to a just valuation if it can be avoided, and that paying “a liberal
price” would be better “than to recur to Court and Jury.” Id. Despite Coxe’s professed
willingness to pay a “liberal price,” one wonders whether Coxe may also have been
nervous that a valuation proceeding could lead to imposition of an unfair price by a jury
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The evidence under Coxe’s successor, William Miller, is similar.
After the State of Virginia ceded jurisdiction to the United States for
construction of a new lighthouse at New Point Comfort, the Treasury
Department found itself dealing with an unreasonable land owner.
Although the state law contained no authorization of condemnation
proceedings, the local federal official raised the prospect of resorting to
one—but summarily dismissed it out of fears that the federal government
would find itself mistreated: “As far as I can discover, there seems in that
neighborhood a general disposition to make the United States pay well for
the scite of a Lighthouse, and I suspect that even a jury from that vicinity,
under a writ of ad quod damnum, would estimate the price not by the real
value of the article, but by the ability of the purchaser, the Public.”149
On the other hand, in a situation where the State of New Jersey had
not yet ceded jurisdiction, Miller wrote the following as his agent wrestled
with a stubbornly unfair bargainer:
If the Mercantile interest of New York
were to represent to the New Jersey
legislature during the Session which will
immediately take place, that their interference
is necessary, I trust that they would without
hesitation, provide some mode of converting
as much ground as may be necessary in this

partially disposed towards the owner.
Rhode Island had ceded both title and jurisdiction over the Newport Lighthouse in
1793—four years before Coxe wrote his letter authorizing his superintendent to obtain the
“soil” by purchase or condemnation. Back in 1790 and 1791, when the federal government
was first attempting to obtain a cession of jurisdiction, there had been some question
regarding whether the State of Rhode Island actually owned the lighthouse land, which was
claimed by a Jerathmel Bowers. VI Syrett 550 (Ellery to Hamilton, dated Aug. 2, 1790);
VIII Syrett 163, 332 (Ellery to Hamilton, Mar. 7, 1791, and May 9, 1791). The matter
appears to have been dropped, for reasons not explained in the historical record. Coxe
picked up the matter in 1797, again for reasons that are not clear. His letter appears to be
his last word on the subject, and local land records do not reflect a transfer of rights to the
United States. However, years later, in 1804, a private transfer of land from a “John
Bowers” contained exception for “such part and portion thereof as this State or the United
States have a right or title to….” The exception apparently refers to the lighthouse land.
(Correspondence from Mary R. Miner to the author, dated Mar. 17, 2003, containing
relevant excerpts from the local land evidence book; on file with the author).
149
William Davies to William Miller, dated Jan. 31, 1802 (National Archives, Wash.
D.C., RG 26, 17A). The writ of ad quod damnum was used when land was valued in
condemnation proceedings. See Attorney General v. Turpin, 13 Va. 548 (1809)
(emanation, execution, and return of writ of ad quod damnum automatically divests owner
of title over land to be valued).
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instance, to public use, without requiring
more than the just value.150
Significantly, we see that Miller suggests not just that the state could
clear the path for condemnation, but that the state actually would have the
power to require the federal government to pay more than “just value.”
What could possibly be the source of such power? As we have already
seen, it is a power that stems directly from the Enclave Clause: New Jersey
could require excess compensation as a condition of their consent to cede
jurisdiction over the land.151
People understood long before the Kohl case that the states’ power
to withhold consent under the Enclave Clause did not constitute a power to
prevent federal exercise of the power of eminent domain.152 But as a
practical matter, the lighthouse administration’s general policy to obtain
exclusive jurisdiction over all lighthouse lands (a policy established by the
Lighthouse Act and subsequent congressional lighthouse enactments) gave
that power to the states. And it is easy to see how conflation of the takings
clause with the consent required under the Enclave Clause could occur,
particularly in arguments by those seeking to limit federal authority.153
150

William Miller to David Gelston, dated Oct. 20, 1801 (NARA, RG 26, 17A).
When this matter finally did get resolved by the New Jersey legislature, they passed
a law consenting to purchase of the land, ceding jurisdiction over the land upon such
purchase, and providing for an appraisement proceeding if the owner and the federal
government could not come to terms. N.J., ch. 131 (Mar. 1, 1804).
152
In 1808, Jefferson sent a message to Congress informing them of the difficulties the
executive branch was having carrying out its duties under an act calling for fortification of
ports and harbors. The problem, Jefferson said, stemmed from property being held by
those incapable of consenting to transfer (such as minors) or by those who refuse to
transfer, “or demand a compensation far beyond the liberal justice allowable in such
cases.” In submitting the matter to Congressional consideration, Jefferson pointed them to
their power to take property with just compensation, and concluded:
I am aware that, as the consent of the legislature of the state to the
purchase of the site may not, in some instances, have been previously
obtained, exclusive legislation cannot be exercised therein by Congress
until that consent is given. But, in the mean time, it will be held under
the
same laws which protect the property of the United States, in the same
state . . . .
VI House Journal 245-46, Thomas Jefferson to the Senate and House of
Representatives, March 25, 1808.
153
The early history of federal “takings” is often described as a process in which states
condemned land for the federal government. See William B. Stoebuck, A General Theory
of Eminent Domain, 47 Wash. L. Rev. 553, 559 n.18 (Aug. 1972); Lawrence Berger, The
Public Use Requirement in Eminent Domain, 57 Ore. L. Rev. 203, 212 (1978). However,
as the Baker’s Island episode makes clear, the federal government did at times condemn
property in its own name—but simply using state-mandated procedures. See United States
151
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Whatever political reasons later prevented the federal government
from more assertively condemnation powers in the 19th century, the
lighthouse administration’s early practices under the Enclave Clause should
not be overlooked. Whenever the federal government used state-mandated
condemnation procedures even after the Supreme Court’s Kohl decision, it
was simply following in the footsteps set a century earlier in Webbs Tavern.
B. The Takings Clause in Internal Improvement Debates
Though some Congressmen in the early nineteenth century
questioned federal takings power, there were also numerous Congressmen
who did not.154 In fact, three internal improvement resolutions that
contained explicit recognition of the federal takings power garnered the
support of almost half of Congress.155 These supporters of the eminent
domain power seemed to stand on firmer textual ground.
For instance, some opponents argued that federal takings power
required state consent. That’s not a surprising argument, given that issues
of state consent were inextricably intertwined with broader internal
improvement questions, such as whether the federal government could build
a road or canal within the boundaries of an objecting state even if it were
able to purchase property from private individuals.156 But looking at the
text of the Constitution, the only potentially relevant provision
incorporating a “consent” requirement is the Enclave Clause. And that

v. Dumplin Isl., 1 Barb. 24 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1847). In approving the federal government’s
taking of Baker’s Island, it is difficult to imagine that Tench Coxe would have believed that
the Massachusetts legislature could have empowered the federal government to do
something that it was otherwise prohibited from doing under the Constitution. See Dickey
v. Maysville, Washington, Paris and Lexington Turnpike Rd. Co., 37 Ky. (7 Dana) 113
(1838) (if power not delegated to Congress by the Constitution, consent of state could not
give that power to Congress).
154
See, e.g., 31 Annals of Cong. 1131 (B. Smith), 1169 (Clay), 1193 (Cushman), 1221
(Simkins), 1235 (Lowndes), 1295 (Mercer) (1818); 5 Reg. Deb. 248 (Strong), 269 (Fort),
286 (Smith) (1829); 6 Register of Debates 642 (1830)(Hemphill).
155
32 Annals of Congress 1382-89 (1818); Larson, Internal Improvement at 118. A
number of the legislators who spoke out in favor of the takings power came from
slaveholding states, which suggests that the motivations of nineteenth century debaters on
the issue are more complicated than present eminent domain historiography allows. Cf.
Timothy Sandefur, A Natural Rights Perspective on Eminent Domain in California: A
Rationale for Meaningful Judicial Scrutiny of “Public Use,” 32 Southwestern Univ. L. Rev.
569, n.267 (suggesting that Congress limited eminent domain powers to avoid issue of
whether federal government could free slaves by “taking” them).
156
31 Annals of Cong. 1135 (1818) (state consent was required for both taking and
purchase of land).
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clause—as internal improvement debaters pointed out—bore on issues of
exclusive jurisdiction, not soil.157
Similarly, one Congressman was willing to infer some power from
the Fifth Amendment, but contended that the power was limited simply to
times of war when the government has to destroy property or temporarily
take it for public purposes.158 That is not an unreasonable concept, but
nothing in the language of the Fifth Amendment limits its operation either
to personal property or times of war.159 And again, decades earlier two
Supreme Court justices had already read the clause far more broadly (not to
mention the more recent views of President Jefferson).
Putting text aside, though, the one thing that eminent domain
supporters did not have on their side was a wealth of precedent to cite. One
member was able to remember one instance of a federal taking involving a
property owner affected by construction of the Cumberland Road.160
Beyond that, though, all he could say was that the taking of private property
only appeared “a little novel” to Congress because they were not
“familiarized with it.”161
Precedent, of course, may not have changed the political outcome.
But we have already seen how it could affect the Constitutional debate.
Current historiography assumes that the lack of precedent stems from an
“original” doubt in the founding era regarding existence of a federal
eminent domain power. But that same dominant history simultaneously
explains the Fifth Amendment’s wording as resulting from the fact that
politicians in the 1790s understood the power of eminent domain as
inhering in the federal government by virtue of its sovereign authority.162

157

Id. at 1239, 1295 (Enclave Clause does not restrain federal power, but rather
provides a way by which exclusive jurisdiction can be obtained); see also 30 Annals of
Cong. 890 (1817) (stating that opponents were confusing issue with consent required for
exclusive jurisdiction).
158
31 Annals of Cong. 1209 (1818) (Austin).
159
Id. at 1243 (Lowndes, refuting Austin’s argument). See James W. Ely, Jr., The
Guardian of Every Other Right 31, 57 (1998) (the Fifth Amendment was both prefigured
by earlier colonial and state developments, and influenced states to incorporate similar
protections in their own constitutions); see also Barron v. Baltimore, 7 Pet. 243 (U.S. 1833)
(rejecting property owner’s claim for compensation under the Fifth Amendment, stemming
from alleged “taking” by the City of Baltimore, because the Fifth Amendment applied only
to the federal government, and not to the states).
160
40 Annals of Cong. 620 (1823) (Hemphill).
161
Id. at 622.
162
See, supra, note ___; Ellen Paul Frankel, Property Rights and Eminent Domain 77
(1987) (“eminent domain was uncontroversial, requiring no elaborate justification”).
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Perhaps further research into the handling of all federal land
acquisitions in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries will show
what the Baker’s Island episode suggests: that failure of a strong federal
eminent domain practice to take hold in the early years of the republic
stemmed not from interpretive doubts shared by a majority of decision
makers, but rather from practices understandably generated by the Enclave
Clause. Not only does the Enclave Clause empower states to impose
limitations on the federal government’s acquisition of properties (if
exclusive jurisdiction is desired, that is), but if the federal government is
going to obtain state consent in any event, there is doubtless some benefit to
having the issue of takings ironed out at the same time.163 That, of course,
could explain why the practice outlived the Kohl decision.
None of the above is intended to suggest that the federal exercise of
eminent domain power was politically uncontroversial, or that federal
officials would not have been shy about exercising it. There is indeed
evidence that in the early 1800s federal practice was fairly comfortable
with the concept of purchasing private land without state consent to
jurisdiction—a comfort level that apparently did not yet embrace
compulsory purchases through condemnation.164 The point here is simply
that whatever accounts for the slow development of federal takings
precedent, we should not assume (a) that it stems from a genuine
widespread concern that a fair reading of the Constitution evidences a lack
of such power; and (b) that any stated nineteenth century doubts on the
matter are reflective of views held by decision makers in the 1790s.
The procedure exercised in Baker’s Island was undoubtedly a
federal taking. It was not a state taking executed on behalf of the federal
government. Neither the repeated use of that procedure, nor its morphing
into circumstances in which states simply exercised their own eminent
domain powers on the federal government’s behalf, should in and of
themselves lead us to conclude that early federal officials doubted their own
Constitutional powers.
Unfortunately, though, there is a tendency to view the Constitution
as muddled until the Supreme Court finally spoke in Kohl. But the
163
See United States v. Jones, 109 U.S. 513, 351 (1883)(upholding use of state
procedures in federal taking: “[F]rom the time of its establishment, [the federal]
government has been in the habit of using, with the consent of the states, their officers,
tribunals, and institutions as its agents. Their use has not been deemed violative of any
principle or as in any manner derogating from the sovereign authority of federal
government; but as a matter of convenience and as tending to a great saving of expense”).
164
31 Annals of Cong. 1296 (1818) (Mercer); 32 Annals of Cong. 1332-33 (1818)
(Tucker).
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Supreme Court justices were not the only ones to think the issue a clear one.
A few years earlier, the Michigan Supreme Court, in a decision holding that
states could not condemn property on behalf of the United States, explained
that the United States itself “may without question seize the property of
individuals”—and that doing so was “but an ordinary exercise of the right
of eminent domain.”165 Decades before that, numerous Congressmen
believed the same thing. Did Tench Coxe believe any differently when he
authorized the taking of land, according to state-approved procedures, back
in 1797?
CONCLUSION
The development of Constitutional precedent and the development
of accepted meanings of the text do not always go hand in hand. With the
birth of the federal lighthouse system, we see that circumstances (the need
for a fair imposition of a federal tax program) created Commerce Clause
precedent well before Congress was prepared to accept the potentially broad
Constitutional construction embodied by the Lighthouse Act of 1789. On
the other hand, federal practices related to the Enclave Clause may well
have slowed development of Takings Clause precedent more than original
shared understandings of the power would have otherwise dictated.
To the Congress of the early nineteenth century, whether or not
precedent should dictate Constitutional construction was a matter of debate.
Earlier 18th century ideas of a customary constitution built upon past
practices still had rhetorical force. And though such ideas clearly had their
detractors, it is difficult to read the internal improvement debates without
sensing that legislative precedent was moving the meaning of the
Constitution regardless of the words and arguments that could be piled up
to stop it, and regardless of the ultimate results reached in the political
process. As one internal improvement foe in Congress recognized with
great resignation in 1830:
I will not enter into the discussion of the
abstract constitutional right of the
Government to make roads and canals in the
several States, without the consent of the
States or the people. It has been assumed and
exercised so often, that, until some express
provision to the contrary shall be made in the

165

Trombley v. Humphrey, 23 Mich. 471 (1871).
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constitution, it is worse than useless to
question the power.166
Likewise, the force of negative precedent (the “non-user” of a power)
could slow Constitutional interpretation, rather than vice versa. Looking
back at the historical record, issues of cause and effect are not always clear.
Did practices such as the taking at Baker’s Island stem from a diminished
view of federal takings power, or did they simply help solidify that view? If
indeed the current historiography is correct that the federal government
never took property without state assistance until the 1870s,167 the historical
evidence from the lighthouse administration in the 1790s suggests that the
generally accepted explanation of that large gap (a nineteenth century belief
that the federal government lacked eminent domain authority without state
consent) is either terribly oversimplified or overlooks a historical “break”
from an earlier, more expansive, understanding of federal power—an
understanding that got “mistranslated” for later generations by virtue of the
early practice of obtaining Enclave Clause jurisdictional consent for all
lighthouse acquisitions.

166

6 Reg. Deb. 728 (1830) (Monell).
Given the contemporaneous widely held view that individual states could not
consensually expand the federal government’s powers under the Constitution, it is difficult
to see why state consent (or even state procedures) should matter doctrinally. The
Massachusetts statute underlying the Baker’s Island taking does not change the fact that the
federal government itself appropriated private property back in 1797.
167

